Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-187
Tuesday
27 September 1994

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-187 *27 September 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

BULGARIA

Four Parties Establish Election Campaign Alliance *[Sofia Radio]* 1
SDS Council Issues Declaration on Elections *[DEMOKRATSIYA 22 Sep]* 1

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus Accused of Ordering Ouster of Editor *[PRAGUE POST 13 Sep]* 2
Chemapol Chief Suspected of Working for STB *[PRAGUE POST 13 Sep]* 3
No Reason Seen To Support Budget 'Gimmick' *[PRAGUE POST 13 Sep]* 3
Poll Indicates Public's Anxiety Over Crime *[PRAGUE POST 13 Sep]* 4

SLOVAKIA

FOCUS Sep Poll Assesses Party Support *[NARODNA OBRODA 21 Sep]* 6
Meciar Pledges Revitalization of Arms Industry *[Prague Radio]* 7
SDL's Weiss on Topical Preelection Issues *[SMENA 22 Sep]* 7
On Postelectoral Coalition *[LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Sep]* 8
Council Criticizes TV Campaign as Unobjective *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 23 Sep]* 9

POLAND

Sejm Speaker Says Walesa Impeachment Possible *[Warsaw Radio]* 10
Possible Presidential Election Scenarios Outlined *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 24 Sep]* 10
Possible UW Government Coalitions Viewed *[WPROST 25 Sep]* 10
Weekly Deems Pawlak 'Worst' Prime Minister *[WPROST 25 Sep]* 11
Walesa, Pawlak Discuss Economy, Police Candidacy *[PAP]* 12
Columnist Comments on Conflict Within KRRiT *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Sep]* 13
Media Treatment of Military, Defense Issues *[WOJSKO I WYCHOWANIE Aug]* 13
Polish-German Trade Chamber Established *[GAZETA POZNANSKA 17-18 Sep]* 14
Social Policy Action Guidelines Presented *[PRZEGLAD RZADOWY May]* 15

ROMANIA

Iliescu Calls Talks With Clinton 'Significant' *[Bucharest Radio]* 22
Foreign Office Minister Hogg Arrives in Bucharest *[Bucharest Radio]* 22
Talks With Dinu, Nastase *[Bucharest Radio]* 22
PNTCD Leader Says Letter to U.S. 'Mistake' *[Bucharest Radio]* 23

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Postponement of Arms Embargo Exemption Urged *[TANJUG]* 24
Mladic Gives UN 2 Weeks To Take 'Positive Steps' *[BORBA 26 Sep]* 24
UNPROFOR: 'Tense Relations' With Serbs Easing *[AFP]* 24
UNPROFOR To Begin Repairing Power Pylons *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Sarajevo Remains Without Water, Electricity *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Safety Concerns Prompt UNHCR Aid Decision *[AFP]* 25

Buha: UN 'Implicitly' Recognizes Srpska Republic *[TANJUG]* 25
Silajdzic Views 'Unjust' Plan, FRY Sanctions *[BORBA 21 Sep]* 25
TANJUG Views U.S. Policy on Embargo 28
Opposing Sides Discuss Exchange of Prisoners *[Mostar Radio]* 29
Croat, Muslim 'Terrorists' Clash Near Tuzla *[TANJUG]* 29
Agreement Reached To Clear All Mostar Barricades *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
Presidency Member on Obstacles Facing Federation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
Ambassador to Croatia Views Federation *[OSLOBODJENJE 15 Sep]* 31

CROATIA

Tudjman, Clinton Discuss Reintegration Process *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Tudjman 'Absolutely Satisfied' *[Zagreb TV]* 34
Economic Cooperation Pact With Sarajevo Signed *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Karlovac Refugees Protest Muslims Taking Homes *[Zagreb Radio]* 34

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Albania's Zhulali Notes Prospects for Partnership *[MILS-NEWS 26 Sep]* 36
Four Candidates To Contest Presidential Election *[MILS-NEWS 26 Sep]* 36
PDP Campaign Supports 'Multiethnic' Concept *[VECER 26 Sep]* 36

SLOVENIA

Party Leader Explains Motives for New Coalition *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 10 Sep]* 37

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Stoltenberg, Owen To See Milosevic, Hear Report *[TANJUG]* 40
Meet Border Observer Chief *[AFP]* 40
To Inspect Border *[AFP]* 40
Sainovic on Conditions for Economic Stability *[Belgrade TV]* 40
Easing of FRY Sanctions May Take Effect 28 Sep *[TANJUG]* 41
TANJUG, Slovak Agency Agree To Cooperate *[TANJUG]* 41

Serbia

Party Leaders Comment on Lifting Sanctions *[TANJUG]* 41
Commentary Welcomes UN Vote To Ease Sanctions *[Belgrade TV]* 42
DSS Chairman Kostunica's Visit to Pale Viewed *[NEDELJNA BORBA 18 Sep]* 42

Kosovo

Rugova, Albanian Envoy Discuss Balkan Situation *[Tirana TV]* 44
Rugova Views Current Events, Ties With Albania *[Tirana TV]* 44
Rugova Opposes Easing Sanctions Against Serbia
[Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 26 Sep] 44

Four Parties Establish Election Campaign Alliance

AU2609205494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] An hour ago, four political parties—the ASP [Alternative Social Liberal Party], GOR [Civic Alliance for the Republic], BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party], and the Green Party—signed an agreement to form an election campaign alliance in the National Palace of Culture in Sofia. It is an election campaign coalition that will be open for other parties to join.

The founders decided that the name of the coalition will be the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR], and the agreement was signed by Professor Nikolay Vasilev for the ASP, Aleksandur Tomov for GOR, Dr. Petur Dertliev for the BSDP, and Aleksandur Karakachanov for the Green Party.

This is the first official coalition formed since 13 October 1991, Prof. Nikolay Vasilev said, adding that its members are political agents with high ethics. According to GOR Chairman Aleksandur Tomov, the election campaign alliance is aimed at changing Bulgarian politics and eliminating the bipolar political model. A great day for Bulgarian democracy—this was how BSDP leader Petur Dertliev described the occasion, while according to Aleksandur Karakachanov the new election campaign alliance represents a new alternative for Bulgaria.

SDS Council Issues Declaration on Elections

AU2709094394 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 22 Sep 94 p 1

[Report on declaration adopted by the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces on 21 September: "SDS Opposes Secret Deals About Fatherland's Fate"]

[Text] The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] officially returned to the president the mandate on forming a new cabinet, a declaration of the SDS National Coordinating Council, adopted on 21 September, reads.

For the second time since 1992, when the government of Filip Dimitrov was toppled, the SDS demonstrated that it does not strive toward power and does not aspire by all means to form a cabinet and rule in a fictitious manner, on the basis of unworthy political deals.

Our political opponents constantly repeat that the SDS fears elections, because it knows that it will lose them.

If this were so, the SDS would have made every effort to form a cabinet, precisely as those whose political cunning led Bulgaria to the abyss of crime, poverty, and corruption do.

These days we will certainly hear many pathetic speeches regarding how a government could save the country, how the money that would have been spent on new elections could be saved, what a terrible winter awaits us, how a budget must be formed, and how a new cabinet could eliminate crime.

However, the people know that those who will vote for such a cabinet are the same people who brought the procommunist cabinet of Professor Berov to power.

The same majority of Ahmed Dogan and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and their satellites, is prepared now to form a new cabinet under the cover of the secret vote. This will be the cabinet of demagogy.

The SDS decisively opposes a new secret deal regarding the fate of the fatherland. The SDS demands that the voice of our people is heard, rather than the wail of the political clowns, ready to sell young Bulgaria's future.

The SDS wants new elections and believes in its victory.

We believe, the declaration reads further, that the people will never again entrust with power those who deliberately impoverished Bulgaria and utilized organized crime as a private army in charge of protecting their spoils.

Therefore, the SDS wants new elections, which will provide it with the opportunity of effecting a stable government in the next four years.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Klaus Accused of Ordering Ouster of Editor

94CH0422A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 13 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ross Crockford and Andre Vltchek: "Klaus Denies Ousting Editor"]

[Text] Mutual distrust between local journalists and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) intensified following allegations that Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and ODS Deputy Chairman Petr Cermak ordered the removal of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper TELEGRAF for publishing articles critical of the ODS-led government.

Both Klaus and Cermak dismissed the allegations, leveled by the departing TELEGRAF chief and 17 employees who left with him, as hysterical "nonsense"—though initial comments made by the politicians suggested that they had at least a passing interest in the editorial direction of the business-oriented paper.

The confused chain of events started to unravel on Aug. 29, during a telephone interview between Cermak and TELEGRAF editor Jan Kreuzer. At one point in the interview Cermak asked whether Viktor Krejci, another TELEGRAF editor, had accepted an offer to become editor-in-chief. TELEGRAF employees, who said they had no idea such a change was in the works, then confronted Krejci, who admitted that he had been offered the job.

The following day, TELEGRAF Editor-in-Chief Pavel Safr sent a fax to Klaus demanding to know whether Cermak had taken steps to have him removed. Klaus immediately faxed a reply saying that claims that the ODS was involved were "absurd" and that Safr "really must not be afraid" of losing his post, because TELEGRAF was "the daily [newspaper] closest to our political ideals."

But later that day, Safr was asked to resign. Safr said he met with Libor Prochazka, the secretary of Investicni a postovni banks (IPB), which owns Integra, the company which in turn owns and publishes TELEGRAF. According to Safr, Prochazka told him that he regarded the ODS as the only "real representative of the right wing in the Czech Republic," and since TELEGRAF had recently published articles criticizing the government, the "political orientation" of the newspaper was "in doubt" and would have to be corrected.

In particular, Safr said the bank objected to TELEGRAF stories reporting on problems with the privatization of the Czech oil industry and alleging that the director of the national chemical trading company, Chemapol, was a former secret-police agent. Safr claimed that Prochazka then offered him a managerial post with the television station Premiera or a radio station—respectively owned in whole and in part by the bank—if he left TELEGRAF quietly.

Safr refused. On Sept. 1, he tendered his resignation and accused Cermak on television and in the local press of ordering his removal. Later that evening, TELEGRAF employees met, and 17 of them decided to resign along with Safr.

In reply, Cermak told reporters that "withdrawing a daily's editor-in-chief is done by that daily's publisher. I have not the least intention of meddling in the publisher's business or in the lineup of any paper's editorial office." Cermak said he knew about the changes at TELEGRAF only because of earlier conversations he had had with another reporter at the paper.

On behalf of the publisher, IPB spokesman Jan Rezek sent out a prepared statement that Integra had "the full right to make any changes in the head offices of [TELEGRAF]" and considered that attempts to turn those changes into a political affair could be "part of a pre-election campaign." The statement also declared that "Integra has followed its economic interests in trying to improve the newspaper, and in no case is the company under any political pressure."

Rezek later told the daily LIDOVE NOVINY that IPB's directors include the head advisor to the prime minister's office and Miroslav Tera, a deputy minister of finance. The state owns 34 percent of the shares in IPB.

Safr claimed that it was impossible to argue that he was removed for "economic" reasons, because since he became editor-in-chief of TELEGRAF in the spring of 1993, circulation of the paper has increased by one-third, to about 40,000 daily.

Representatives of parties that will be battling the ODS in the upcoming municipal elections condemned the involvement of ODS leaders in the TELEGRAF affair, though they share power with the party in the national governing coalition.

"It's immoral, even if it's not completely against the law," said Karel Ledvinka, deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). "If there were any influence upon TELEGRAF, it would be a severe violation of all rules," said Marek Benda, chairman of the parliamentary club of the Christian Democratic Party (KDS).

Prime Minister Klaus rebuffed the criticism, arguing that it was "stupid" to think that people were working behind the scenes to turn TELEGRAF into an ODS party newspaper. He told reporters that he had been genuinely surprised when Safr resigned, and that it was completely absurd that the ODS wanted to "bring down" TELEGRAF's editorial office.

In the end, the only person who remained quiet about the affair was TELEGRAF's new editor-in-chief. "I feel sick about all of this, and I don't want to say anything," said Viktor Krejci, who admitted that he had agreed with the directors of Integra not to discuss the matter.

Krejci, who was referred to by fellow TELEGRAF employees as the "palace reporter" because his earlier work consisted mainly of weekly interviews with the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

prime minister and pro-government editorials, has been complimented by Klaus as "the most intelligent journalist working in the Czech Republic."

Comment about the affair was absent from the Sept. 2 issue of TELEGRAF, the first under the new editorship. The front page instead featured a warm interview with Klaus, avoiding any questions about government interference with the media. The byline below the interview belonged to Viktor Krejci.

Chemapol Chief Suspected of Working for STB

94CH0422C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 13 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Victor Gomez: "What Spy Past? Asks Top Oil Man"]

[Text] For a man who has been accused of being a secret-police agent, a trade-secret thief and a dealer with Russia's mafia, Vaclav Junek is taking it all rather well.

A string of unproven allegations could derail his bid to be the top man in the Czech oil industry, but the Chemapol chief sees himself as no more than a victim both of the media's temporary summer boredom and of jealousy over his success.

"It is part of the character of the Czech nation to be reluctant as far as success is concerned," he says with an impressive and fluid command of English. "If someone is successful, the immediate reaction is, 'How could it be done? I could not do it, but he did it. There must be something [suspect] behind it.'"

Chemapol is the chemical trading company that imports most of the Czech Republic's oil from Russia. Along with the International Oil Consortium of Western companies and other Czech firms, Chemapol has put in a bid for the country's two major petroleum plants, Chemopetrol Litvinov and Kaucuk Kralupy.

After rejecting one proposal from the Ministry of Trade and Industry this summer, the government is expected to consider a new one Sept. 15.

While Chemapol's bid has been battered by bad press, some of the news reports went well beyond vague suspicions and conspiracy theories. An article that appeared in a mid-August issue of the weekly newspaper RESPEKT actually delved into the minutiae of Junek's alleged activities as a "voluntary" agent in the 1980s. The report, which claimed to be based on Ministry of Interior documents, alleged that Junek had stolen secrets about anti-oxide from France.

While he never denied that there may be a former agent or two among the ranks of Chemapol, Junek repeatedly insisted that he was never one of them.

"Chemapol was in contact with the secret police, but if somebody says we were working against someone, he's lying. Even Ruml never named someone."

Ruml—a former dissident who suffered at the hands of communist toughs—tossed a grenade into the oil debate when he said he had "conclusive evidence" that a highly placed official at Chemapol was once employed by the communist secret police.

Junek seemed lukewarm to the idea of suing RESPEKT. "I gave it to my lawyers to analyze it, but it's so stupid.... This attack was one of the weakest against me, I would say."

Ruml's file on security issues at Chemapol may settle the disagreement, but the minister has no reason to release it and probably no legal right. It is not against the law for a former secret-police agent to hold a high-ranking position at a privatized company such as Chemapol.

As if the agent allegations weren't enough, Ruml also raised the issue of Chemapol's connections with Russian oil companies. This, of course, summoned up these twin specters: Russian dominance and potential mafia involvement in the industry.

While Junek allows that no one can really know the extent of organized-crime penetration into the Russian oil industry, he strongly denies that his company is dealing with suspect companies in Russia. He points out that Chemapol's main trading partner in the country, Nafta-Moscow, also has commercial contacts with Western companies such as Shell.

"I can assure everybody that there are no links between Chemapol and Russian companies—except for normal producers of crude," he says.

The whole affair prompted Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to tell the leftist daily RUDE PRAVO that he is upset at what he called the wave of "agentmania" sweeping the country.

While he says the media exposure on him and his company has not been "pleasant," the Chemapol chairman doesn't blame any specific person for the unconfirmed allegations that have been leveled at him. Actually, he blames the press, but he puts a forgiving veneer over it.

"I'm really pretty sure that it was the result of the [summer] period in which there is not much news to report," he says.

Junek doesn't seem visibly angry, even when the subject of Ruml's behavior comes up. He agrees with the interior minister that former secret-police connections are a relevant part of the oil-privatization debate.

"Ruml's report was a necessary initiative which added to the argument for this or that privatization proposal."

No Reason Seen To Support Budget 'Gimmick'

94CH0422B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 13 Sep 94 p 17

[Article by Daniel Kumermann, editor on the foreign desk at LIDOVE NOVINY: "Opposition, Allies Turn Against ODS Budget Proposal"]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

[Text] If the recent proposal for a constitutional amendment ordering the government to keep the budget balanced was meant to make a big splash, it was a great success. If the intention was something different, a big question mark lingers.

Strange ideas have come out of meetings of the executive council of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) before. To name two: the non-starter plan for dividing the country into umpteen regions, and the proposal on how to hold elections for the unborn Senate. But in both these cases, the absurdity hit home only after a long debate.

One could even speak about a full-fledged strategy by the ODS in such instances: If you do not know how to proceed, just clog the public debate with nonsense and then hide behind it.

This time, however, the story was different; the whole balanced budget proposal came out of the blue. The ODS was not at all pushed into a corner by the upcoming parliamentary debate on next year's budget. Rather, it seemed simply to think that there was consensus on the balanced budget proposal within the governing coalition.

Some economists belonging to coalition parties have made theoretical claims that a year is not a "normal" economic cycle, and therefore a yearly balance is nonsensical. There are also arguments and counterarguments within the coalition concerning social issues such as the amount of financing for higher education.

Yet despite all the disagreements, the members of the coalition did in fact generally agree on a balanced-budget gimmick as a public-relations asset.

The recent ODS suggestion, however, managed to upset everybody straight across the political playing field—even the meekest of coalition politicians. After initial disbelief, their voices grew loud and were transformed into sharp accusations. Even several leading ODS members joined in the chorus—chief among them the minister of foreign affairs and deputy chairman of the party, Josef Zieleniec.

The big question mark mentioned at the start of this article is mainly about why this happened at all. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus could not—even in his wildest dreams—have imagined that the proposal would pass through the parliament. His coalition holds 106 seats; the support of at least 120 deputies is needed to pass a constitutional amendment.

Most of the parliamentary opposition to the proposal is at least nominally on the left, and would block any law that would bar pumping more money into the economy down the road should the left come to power. Not only that, but passage of the bill would strengthen the image Klaus sometimes tries to present of himself as a big, caring father figure.

The coalition has been in power for over two years now. That being the case, the ODS leadership should know something about its partners in leadership, particularly about their long-standing suspicions of their "big brother's" intentions. These suspicions peak when the ODS does something unexpected. And when the ODS knowingly suggests something absurd that has no chance of ever being realized, surely that qualifies as unexpected.

The internal tensions in the coalition seemed to have eased during the summer, and it is difficult to imagine a reason why there should be an effort to rock the boat now. If the boat had not been rocked and rocked hard, there would have been no need for the kind of dissent expressed by Zieleniec and others.

Out of all the accusations hurled at the ODS recently, the most frequent one alleged that the party is already attempting to score points for the November local elections. That would in fact appear to be the case with the balanced-budget proposal, but one would have thought the ODS leadership was clever enough to realize that the budget is too abstract an issue for the "masses," and also could prove to be a double-edged sword.

As the noose closes around the balanced-budget proposal, no rational reason can be found for supporting it. Thus, only pure irrationality remains. According to the leader of the Social Democrats, Milos Zeman, an "economic psychiatrist" should be called in to investigate.

For once, Zeman does not seem to be exaggerating.

This case obviously has very little to do with the economy. Rather, it deals with the fact that this past summer was plainly too much for Klaus.

It started with Margaret Thatcher calling on him in Prague, a visit that one British paper characterized as "incestuous." Since then, each subsequent visitor has heaped praise upon host Klaus. No wonder the prime minister's old messianic complex was awakened from its slumber and demanded something glorious as his gift to posterity—the balanced-budget proposal.

Only time will tell whether this outburst of messianism is part of a permanent condition or just a political misstep. It is truly difficult to determine which might be better—or rather less bad—considering that Zeman might eventually be an alternative leader.

Poll Indicates Public's Anxiety Over Crime

94CH0422D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 13 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Emma McClune: "Czechs Fear Crime Wave That Isn't Really There"]

[Text] Bohdana Mrazova is so scared of being attacked by a stranger that she is afraid to set foot outside her front door. An 85-year-old widow living in a Prague 8 apartment building, she believes that violent crime has gotten out of hand.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

"I don't use the lift—that's where they wait for you," she said. "My daughter does my shopping. I don't speak to foreigners. They're bringing all these drugs and guns into our country. I see it on television."

While most Czechs may still be riding their elevators, an opinion poll by the Czech Institute of Public Opinion shows that increasing numbers of people consider the rising crime rate to be the country's most urgent problem.

Ironically, the kind of violent crime Mrazova and others fear has increased only marginally since 1990. Some types, such as assaults causing serious bodily harm, have decreased slightly over the last four years.

The facts haven't changed the perception that violent crime is out of control. In March, the Prague-based public-opinion institute presented 17 social problems to a geographically dispersed group of 809 Czechs ranging in age from 15 to 80. They were asked to rate social problems' importance.

The results showed that 85 percent considered "general crime" a matter of "great urgency."

"General crime," which includes crime against property and people, was considered of greater urgency than the economic crimes of corruption (bribery and fraud) that, according to police statistics, constitute the fastest-growing category of crime.

Types of crime that have only recently been introduced to this part of the world have received attention in the Czech press. Relatively new crimes, such as internationally organized mafia activity, car smuggling and thefts of art and religious artifacts, have all been front-page news.

Television coverage of illegal drug and explosives marketing in sensationalist programs, such as Czech Television's *Pachatel Neznamy—vysetrovani pokracuji* (Culprit Unknown—Ongoing Investigations), has also captured the public imagination. In March alone, at the same time that the institute was conducting its opinion poll, the monthly broadcast of the CTV program attracted 2.1 million viewers.

Pavel Kuchar, a researcher with the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at Charles University, considers the institute's opinion poll too vague to be helpful in drawing any significant conclusions.

Kuchar said that, in his own research, he has found the highest levels of concern among the elderly, women living alone and residents of the poorer areas of Prague. Confidence in the police varies across the social spectrum.

But in a comparison of European nations' crime levels, the Czech Republic lags far behind. Holland was atop the table with 10,181 crimes per 100,000 people in 1993. Germany was second with 7,837. The Czech Republic reported just under half as many crimes per 100,000 residents as Germany.

—Maryam Gopaul and Edita Vokalova assisted with this report.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

FOCUS Sep Poll Assesses Party Support

AU2709090294 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Juraj Alner: "Last Preelection Arithmetic Permits Various Combinations"]

[Text] We usually publish the median, the average, and the values of public opinion polls. Regarding the latest FOCUS agency poll, we provide the interval of reliability—that is, the difference between the upper and lower limits. We provide, furthermore, the median value for September and, for the sake of comparison, the previous median value, for August:

	Interval	Median Value Sep	Median Value Aug
	(Percent)		
HZDS-RSS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers Party of Slovakia]	21.5 - 27.3	24.4	29
SV [Common Choice]	15.2 - 20.8	18.2	15
MK [Hungarian Coalition]	8.9 - 13.1	11.0	10
KDH [Christian Democratic Movement]	7.3 - 11.1	9.2	9
DU [Democratic Union]	7.3 - 11.1	9.2	8
ZRS (Association of Workers of Slovakia)	6.4 - 10.0	8.2	8
DS [Democratic Party]	4.2 - 7.4	5.8	5
SNS [Slovak National Party]	2.8 - 5.4	4.1	6

The other parties have not reached the 5-percent threshold. They are ranked as follows: Communist Party of Slovakia (3.2), New Slovakia (2.4), Party Against Corruption (1.7), Christian Social Union (1.5), Movement for a Prosperous Czecho-Slovakia (0.7), Social Democracy (0.3), and Romany Civic Initiative (0.3).

The ranking of most trustworthy personalities has changed only insignificantly against August. The value for August is provided in brackets:

	Percent
Vladimir Meciar	24.6 (26.5)
Jozef Moravcik	19.5 (19.8)
Michal Kovac	16.1 (19.2)
Peter Weiss	13.8 (14.2)
Ivan Gasparovic	6.7 (5.2)
Jan Luptak	6.0 (7.0)
Jan Carnogursky	6.0 (5.2)
Vojtech Bugar	5.0 (3.7)

Other politicians are trusted by fewer than 5 percent of those polled. One change, compared with the previous poll, concerns the declining percentage of those who support exclusively the leaders of their own party. The greatest degree of support among the supporters of their own party or movement is enjoyed by Vojtech Bugar (87 percent) and Ivan Miklos (73 percent). Support for President Michal Kovac is spread most evenly among supporters of many parties or movements (for example, he is trusted by 12 percent of HZDS supporters). Of the election leaders, Jozef Moravcik and Jan Luptak have the widest spectrum of supporters: Moravcik's 100 percent is distributed among DU (26 percent), the SV (14 percent), and so forth, while Luptak, besides 50 percent of supporters from the ZRS, enjoys trust among HZDS and SV supporters.

Compared with the preceding, 1992, election, the greatest proportion of supporters has been retained by Vojtech Bugar, who is supported by 81 percent of those who had voted for the MKDH [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] in 1992. Jan Carnogursky comes second (he is supported by 66 percent of then KDH voters) and Vladimir Meciar third (59 percent of then HZDS voters).

It generally holds true today that supporters of a party or movement also support this party's/movement's leader. SNS supporters represent the only exception, as Jozef Prokes continues to have more supporters among them than SNS Chairman Jan Slota.

A total of 23.4 percent of those polled by FOCUS said that they may still change their decision by the time of the election, while 9.3 percent did not know whether they would change it.

The largest percentage of undecided voters is among DS supporters. If they changed their mind, 25 percent of them would do so in favor of DU, 9 percent in favor of New Slovakia, and 7 percent each in favor of the HZDS or the KDH. Of the still undecided ZRS supporters, 16 percent could still switch to the camp of the SV, 13 percent to the HZDS, and 5 percent each to the SNS or

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

the Communist Party of Slovakia. Of the undecided DU supporters, 10 percent could go over to the DS, 7 percent each to the KDH or the ZRS, and 6 percent to the SV. Of the undecided SV supporters, 9 percent could still switch to DU, 8 percent to the ZRS, and 5 percent to the HZDS, while 9 percent of undecided HZDS supporters could switch to the SNS and 10 percent of undecided KDH supporters to DU.

Aversion among supporters of parties/movements has subsided compared with the past. This is a positive finding of the FOCUS poll. The strongest expressions of aversion are to be found among HZDS supporters, almost 80 percent of whom feel aversion for the MK and 62 percent for the KDH; among MK supporters in relation to the HZDS (70 percent) and the SNS (61 percent); among SV supporters in relation to the MK (60 percent) and KDH (58 percent); among DU supporters in relation to the MK (60 percent) and the HZDS (50 percent); among DS supporters in relation to the HZDS (61 percent) and MK (50 percent); and among ZRS supporters in relation to the MK (62 percent) and the KDH (52 percent). Hence, the MK, the HZDS, and the KDH have the largest number of adversaries.

Another indicator, sympathy for others, bears out the proximity of parties/movements in the eyes of the public. Among HZDS supporters, there is the greatest proportion of sympathizers with the SNS (almost 80 percent), the ZRS, and the SV. SV voters feel the closest toward the ZRS, DU, and the HZDS; KDH supporters toward DU and the SV; DU supporters toward the SV (80 percent), the DS, and the KDH; DS supporters toward the KDH, the SV, DU, and the SNS; ZRS supporters toward the SV (80 percent), the HZDS, and the SNS; and MK supporters toward the KDH and the SV.

How did the potential voters of today's parties/movements vote in 1992? The Hungarian parties have the most faithful voters. It is interesting that 5 percent of their voters are of Slovak nationality. KDH voters are also loyal: 80 percent of them voted for the KDH in 1992. Present HZDS supporters voted in 1992 predominantly for the HZDS (72 percent) and the SNS (6 percent), and 50 percent of SV supporters voted in 1992 for the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] and 15 percent for the HZDS. DU voters are made up of erstwhile HZDS voters (35 percent), Civic Democratic Party-DS voters (13 percent), and SNS voters (9 percent), while ZRS voters switched over from the HZDS (31 percent), the SDL (19 percent), and the SNS (10 percent).

Women's parties (parties with female preponderance among their supporters) are the KDH, DU, the SNS, and the MK.

A strong representation of old-age pensioners is to be found in the KDH, the HZDS, and the MK.

HZDS supporters are the greatest optimists (the greatest percentage of them expects a change for the better after the election). DS and DU supporters are restrained: Their expectations depend on how the election will turn out. At the end of the ladder of optimists are citizens of Hungarian nationality. This, too, is a piece of information that should provide food for thought.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 September on page 1 carries a 300-word "dos"-signed report on the results of the FOCUS poll. The SME report notes that the FOCUS sample comprised 1,039 respondents and that data for the poll was collected between 7 and 14 September 1994.]

Meciar Pledges Revitalization of Arms Industry

LD2709084094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0700 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Tuesday is the last day of the election campaign in Slovakia. Our special correspondent, Martin Dorazin, is there to watch its culmination:

[Dorazin] These last few days also see the end of politicians' tours to attend rallies around Slovakia. Vladimir Meciar reached the end of one such tour yesterday.

At an election gathering of supporters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in Povazska Bystrica, he promised a revitalization of arms manufacturing. We used to make arms, and we will make arms, the HZDS leader said.

A theme that Vladimir Meciar likes to pursue is the expansion of the Slovak highway network. In Povazska Bystrica, he was again heard to say that it is necessary to build 400 kilometers of new highway, preferably immediately.

Mikulas Dzurinda, minister of transport communications and public works, has repeatedly spoken out against these plans, warning of the economic consequences of such steps. According to Dzurinda, highway expansion should not begin until 2010 or 2020, when Slovakia will have its own financial resources and domestic technical capacity. The transport minister is therefore currently pursuing a gradual completion of north-south highways.

SDL's Weiss on Topical Preelection Issues

AU2709094894 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 22 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, conducted by telephone with SMENA readers and "prepared" by Boris Latta in Bratislava on 21 September: "I Do Not Live on Hlboka Street or in a Villa"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Question] I have the impression that the center-left ground is rather overcrowded. Would it not have been better, perhaps, to have formed a five-member coalition, to say the least, instead of the four-member Common Choice [Party of the Democratic Left, Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, Green Party of Slovakia, and Farmers' Movement]?

[Weiss] You are right. We offered the Association of Workers of Slovakia cooperation in the coalition several

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

times. We would have been delighted to have a five-member coalition instead of a four-member one. Unfortunately, we were turned down repeatedly. We put forward an agreement on postelection cooperation. We were turned down again. As far as the Communist Party of Slovakia [KSS] is concerned, it made it clear to us that we are a social-democratic type of party. They are banking on nostalgia for the former regime, and votes cast for the KSS will be "thrown out the window." [passage omitted]

[Question] What will be the main priority of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] after the election?

[Weiss] First, we want to stabilize the country politically by forming a broad coalition government based on cooperation—that is, a government based on what unites us, not on what divides us. Revitalizing the economy, stabilizing it, and, therefore, the koruna is our next priority. We want to create the conditions for strategic investments on the basis of which new job opportunities will be created. Special investments for education is another of our priorities because we have a high standard of education that is admired by the world. However, we could lose this advantage if we do not invest in this sphere in advance. Last but not least, we want to take radical measures in the interest of the population's health. We cannot be satisfied with the fact that, for example, in the young Slovak Republic, men live five to seven years less than in Austria or the FRG. In foreign policy, we support the endeavor to incorporate Slovakia into the European security, political, and economic structures. [passage omitted]

[Question] Sometime after the Velvet Revolution, you said that you will not try to win an election for 10 years. That has changed, however. Following your transformation into the SDL, you flirted with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Later, you formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. Is this zigzagging a kind of search for a place on the political scene? Is it true that you are getting ready to go abroad for a long time?

[Weiss] I will begin at the end. This is another one of those rumors, deliberately spread reports. I found out about it from a government minister who asked me, with great surprise, when I am going to the United States. I do not know anything about this. I am not getting ready to go to the United States. Now for your other question. After the 1992 election, we respected the ratio of forces that came out of them. We tried to formulate a constructive policy. We did not follow the path of absolute opposition at any cost, as was the case with the KDH. However, a domestic political crisis, caused not by us but by the HZDS, erupted. A coalition government was then formed because no other government was possible following the HZDS's departure for the social opposition. We are cooperating with the KDH in the government on the basis of agreements. Admittedly, as a left-wing party, we are not "in general favor," but they respect us. First and foremost, because we have been able to bring talented people into the government. What will happen after the election? The voters will decide. I personally am convinced that Common Choice is the only grouping that can guarantee balance in our country. The more influence it has, the less likelihood there will be of extremist tendencies and the application of some kind of leader principle in politics.

[Question] Would the SDL be able to form a government?

[Weiss] You need to appoint 19 ministers to form a government. We have such people. However, to make use of its major opportunities for development, Slovakia needs a broad coalition government. The voters will decide what kind of coalition it is to be. The more influence Common Choice has in it, the more we will be able to carry out our ideas.

[Question] How would you characterize relations between the SDL and the KDH?

[Weiss] Our problem is not our Weltanschauung because 52 percent of believers voted for us. As many believers voted for us as voted for the KDH in absolute numbers. Our disputes with the KDH were associated with the past, especially in agricultural policy. There is, of course, also a psychological factor here. [passage omitted] We have no illusions about the KDH; it is a right-wing movement, but there are times when it is necessary to cooperate.

[Question] I have a special question that constantly revolves around the SDL. It concerns the SDL's stance toward the Hungarian parties and Hungary per se. The Hungarian Government is strongly marked by its irredentism, and the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia are also marked by irredentism. What is your view on this issue inasmuch as autonomy is one of the aims of the Hungarian parties' program? Have you not adopted a too-"lukewarm" attitude toward this issue?

[Weiss] Our program rejects unequivocally the establishment of territorial autonomy in south and southeast Slovakia. We are of the opinion that, following the adoption of these three laws [on language, signposts, and registers], the standard of protection for minority rights in Slovakia is high. We are opposed to this standard being denigrated; on the contrary, we favor resolving matter-of-factly the problems both Slovaks and Hungarians face in the ethnically mixed areas, problems concerning schooling and the quality of education. The people living in the ethnically mixed areas, whether they are Hungarians or Slovaks, say that they have been living with each other in peace for decades and that seeds of discord are being sown between them from above by certain politicians. [passage omitted]

On Postelectoral Coalition

AU2709095994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 22 Sep 94 p 7

[Interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Slovak Party of the Democratic Left, by Vladimir Misauer in

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Bratislava; date not given: "I Am Not an Autocrat in the Party of the Democratic Left"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Misauer] Several weeks ago, you said that cooperation with the Hungarian coalition is not acceptable for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] because of some demands included in the "Komarno Appeal" and with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] because of the candidacy of the representatives of the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute (SKOI—group of politicians of the former Civic Democratic Union, Jan Langos, for instance). In the election campaign television broadcast last weekend, however, you said that you prefer the government of the coalition cabinet to continue to cooperate with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. How does it fit together?

[Weiss] You have not quoted my statements accurately. I said that the platform of the Komarno Appeal, on which the present coalition of Hungarian parties is based, is not acceptable to the SDL as the platform for government policy, and I said that the inclusion of the people from the SKOI has not at all helped the continuing existence of this coalition. I have exerted enough energy in explaining to a part of the members' and voters' base the necessity of the association of convenience that was established between the SDL and the KDH in this government. However, I neither have, nor do I intend to seek any arguments to justify a coalition association with SKOI.

[Misauer] So, what would your party do if only the four strongest entities—that is, your party, the HZDS, the KDH, and the Hungarian coalition—made it to the parliament? Would you join in a coalition with the KDH and the Hungarians or with the HZDS?

[Weiss] First, I would like to point out that I am not an autocrat in the SDL; second, that the coalition partners will be also making their decisions; and third, that a republic council of the SDL will take place on 15 October. Such a decision depends, above all, on the political program and the general philosophy of politics. For the SDL, I can say that it would be good to ask others this question, so that they take into account the demands defined in the political program of the SDL. We will not be pressured into anything, nor will we succumb to blackmail by anyone from either side.

[Misauer] I must repeat my question because it can be safely assumed that neither the KDH nor the Hungarian parties will change their programs during the few days before the election. What would you do?

[Weiss] Let us leave aside the politics of "what if." Let us wait for the election results, and the decision will come much easier on the basis of the relative strength.

[Misauer] In addition to the postelection arrangement of the Slovak political scene, there are speculations made about disputes within the SDL, the existence of a platform that would be willing to cooperate with the HZDS. Does a pro-Meciar platform really exist within the SDL, and, if so, how strong is it?

[Weiss] All of these speculations emerged on the basis of statements made by the HZDS chairman, and some reporters made it into a gold mine. Let us wait for the session of the SDL republic council.

[Misauer] So, does it exist?

[Weiss] For God's sake, all r[illegible]ters are passing off Mr. Meciar's wishes for reality [illegible]at can I say? Just go on speculating.

Council Criticizes TV Campaign as Unobjective

AU2709095894 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "r": "Advantages (Only) for the Chosen; Slovak Television Council: Unfair Campaign on Television Screens"]

[Text] Bratislava—At an extraordinary meeting on Wednesday, 21 September, the Slovak Television Council discussed the situation regarding the objectivity and independence of television broadcasts during the 1994 election campaign. It noted that, in the period of the campaign, Slovak Television does not guarantee the proper objectivity of broadcasts, extending to some parties and movements opportunities and chances that put other parties and movements at a disadvantage (uneven distribution of time during roundtable discussions, covert and overt advertising of political movements and parties and their candidates outside the set limits, and the like). The Slovak Television Council calls on all political parties and movements and, in particular, on the Slovak Television management to consistently respect valid laws and rules for the presentation of political entities during the election campaign, as well as the requirements of civic decency. It condemns all attempts at making the television screen available to only certain political parties and movements. This conduct runs sharply counter to the Slovak Television Council's ideas, its resolutions, and its agreements with the Slovak Television management. The Slovak Television Council asks the Slovak Television management to draw effective consequences from the violation of laws and the rules of the election campaign.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Sejm Speaker Says Walesa Impeachment Possible

LD2709093194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy has said that, in theory, the impeachment of President Lech Walesa before the Tribunal of State is possible. The president is accused of illegally recalling two members of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiT], Marek Markiewicz and Maciej Ilowiecki, and also appointing, equally illegal, two new individuals in their place.

Appearing on Polish radio's Third Program, Jozef Oleksy stressed that, in order to impeach the president before the Tribunal, certain legal requirements must be met.

[Begin Olesky recording] This is already a drastic situation in which the president stands accused and could be subject to impeachment. I fear that, in Polish legal culture, this would require very serious explanations. If a group is found that accuses the president of violating the law and that pursues this, then, of course, in accordance with the regulations and if the required number of signatures is collected, this will constitute a resolution that will be considered. [end recording]

The Supreme Council of the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] has authorized its Sejm deputies to gather signatures under a resolution for the impeachment of President Lech Walesa before the Tribunal of State.

Possible Presidential Election Scenarios Outlined

WS2609122494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 24 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Robert Krasowski and Igor Zalewski: "Coalition Variants"]

[Text] Politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] have suggested on several occasions that the governing coalition field its own common candidate for president. Their statements (among others, those made by Labor Minister Leszek Miller) pertaining to the possibility of "promoting" Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] to the post of Sejm speaker were interpreted as an attempt to anoint Jozef Oleksy as the common candidate of both parties. Such an option would mean that SLD leader Aleksander Kwasniewski, who has so far been considered to be the sure SLD candidate, has given up his presidential ambitions.

However, we have learned from coalition circles that SLD politicians have presented the peasants with a more intricate concept. In line with it, Kwasniewski is ready to run only if his success is almost certain. As a joint candidate of the SLD-PSL coalition, he would certainly win the election. Why, then, should the post of Sejm speaker be given to Zych inasmuch as Oleksy would not be a candidate?

The answer is that, if the plan is successful, the coalition takes over full control of the Belweder's ministries. Of course, it will not leave Lech Walesa's people there. Oleksy would be the successor to present Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski. If Oleksy went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zych could then become Sejm speaker. Incidentally, already now, as speaker of the Sejm, Oleksy is very interested in international problems.

Such a scenario has been presented to the peasants by SLD politicians. However, the chances of putting it into effect are rather small. The PSL is not thinking about giving up the idea of fielding its own candidate. The candidate will be finally selected by the congress that is to be held in February.

Three names still come into play. The most popular of them is Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. There are opinions within the PSL that, among Pawlak's disadvantages, is his young age, which is rather important in the countryside. The peasants believe that Pawlak does not stand a good chance of attracting voters from outside rural areas.

Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych is not so popular. Within his party, however, he is respected for his great experience, long work in official state posts, and legal skills. As a person who is politically more neutral, he might count on the votes of the rightist, traditional electorate in the second round, if such a round is held.

The third person is Senate Speaker Adam Struzik. This politician is definitely the least known of the three, and his candidacy would be of a tactical nature. There is unofficial talk within the PSL that a secret meeting was recently held by Pawlak and Struzik in the seat of the Plock voivode. The topic is said to have been methods of forcing Struzik's candidacy at the February congress. This would mean that the prime minister is thinking about some agreement with Lech Walesa and that he is closer to an alliance with him than with the coalition partner.

Possible UW Government Coalitions Viewed

WS2709114494 Poznan WPROST in Polish 25 Sep 94 p 16

[Article by B.M.: "Above Divisions"]

[Text] Contrary to popular opinion, Waldemar Pawlak is not a man who cannot be replaced. However, a change in the post of Cabinet head calls for political will, as well as an awareness that the bill for the incompetent steering of the country will be footed not only by him but also by the entire political class. It also requires the abandoning of intraparty quarrels and naive calculations that one can win as a result of bad governing.

The stand of the Freedom Union [UW] plays a key role here. Against the assurances of its leadership, a coalition of UW and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], plus perhaps the Labor Union [UP], would be less "exotic" than the former coalition with the Christian-National Union [ZChN]. The stands taken by most of the present SLD ministers and leaders suggest that not only in economic issues, but also in the area of self-governmental reform, for instance, reaching an agreement would be easier than doing it with the Polish Peasant Party. The

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

fears that, as a result, such a coalition would lose some of the parties' electorate are unfounded. UW lost a lot as a result of making too great concessions toward the ZChN in the ideological sphere. What is more, if the UW leadership really wants to put an end to the smoldering religious war, it will be able to accomplish this goal much more easily by creating a new quality on the political scene. Such an agreement above divisions of the past would indeed make the attacks of the right wing easier; however, it would be accepted by the electorate of UW, the SLD, and UP.

The appointment of Pawlak's successor should not be a big problem, either. Aleksander Kwasniewski is too intelligent a politician to insist on his own candidacy. He also knows that he would find it easier to cooperate with any UW politician. It can be not only Jacek Kuron or one of the leaders of UW's right wing, but also Leszek Balcerowicz, a symbol of the Polish transformation.

Options for forming a minority government are also possible. However, in such a case, the Council of Ministers and the parliament would be much more dependent on the president. Nevertheless, if we assume that Andrzej Olechowski will be appointed prime minister, his governing would also be more favorable than governing by Waldemar Pawlak; it would be more favorable to both the country and the political class.

Weekly Deems Pawlak 'Worst' Prime Minister

WS2709104594 Poznan WPROST in Polish 25 Sep 94 pp 15-17

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur and Marek Zieleniewski, in cooperation with Eryk Mistewicz: "Should Waldemar Pawlak Resign? Uncontrolled Skid"]

[Text] "As a result of such a method of resolving problems, someone higher up should resign," said Lech Walesa, when asked about the problems related to the appointment of a new police chief. Who should resign? "Those who are making things difficult and who are playing when we have so many problems concerning our internal and external security."

The president's attack on the prime minister, because he is delaying the change in the post of police chief, including the threats of withdrawing the three "presidential" ministers from the government, was to be expected. The president is beginning to see that Pawlak is becoming his potentially most dangerous rival in the presidential election. Even though there was unofficial talk about a secret alliance between both politicians and Pawlak even announced that he is not interested in the post of head of state, there is no guarantee that he will not change his mind. If he advances to the second round, Walesa will have no chance of being reelected president. Pawlak's position seems to be all the stronger because, if we take into account the present configuration of forces on the political scene, it is difficult to think of anyone who could replace him as head of government.

Nonetheless, one should ask the following question: Is there a limit beyond which there is no room for party interests and ambitions of politicians and before which the only thing that counts is the interest of the state?

This question is all the more justified because the style of governing presented by Waldemar Pawlak is characterized by utter inconsistency of activities, lack of loyalty toward his own ministers, uncertainty and slowness in making decisions, and preferring the interests of his own party to the interests of the country. As a consequence, economic and self-governmental reforms have been slowed down, and the paralysis of the state's services is aggravating.

Pawlak already displayed a lack of loyalty during the formation of the Cabinet, when he attempted to present his own candidates for ministers without consulting this decision with the leadership of the Democratic Left Alliance. Within just one year of being in office, he has caused a situation in which, in line with the words of Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, "the coalition is of a formal rather than a substantive nature."

The prime minister is subordinating the pace of his activities to the construction of his political position. This also determines his attitude toward his own ministers. He presented himself as a supporter of less rigorous wage-increase restrictions and, in doing so, won popularity with blue-collar workers. At the same time, however, he led to a situation in which it was not really known what stand had been taken by the government on this issue.

The prime minister is also to blame for stopping the privatization process. Delaying a decision in this area causes a state of uncertainty in the interested enterprises and brings into question the feasibility of projected budget revenues. The prime minister has also placed Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek in a difficult situation; Kaczmarek quoted an agreement with the prime minister and publicly announced the date on which the decision on privatizing another group of enterprises would be signed. The prime minister did not, however, sign the document. As a result of measures equally contradictory to earlier agreements, Industry Minister Marek Pol almost handed in his resignation.

Pawlak dismissed Finance Deputy Minister Stefan Kawalec in such a style that Deputy Prime Minister Marek Borowski felt compelled to declare that "he has only one face" and promptly leave the government. The coalition crisis then continued for some unspecified reasons because the head of the Cabinet was not able to specify his stand on the candidacy of Professor Dariusz Rosati.

By introducing a state of paralyzing nervousness among the ministers from outside the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], Pawlak is weakening their position at the cost of the credibility and efficiency of the entire government and at the price of slowing down the pace of economic reform.

The inability to establish cooperation manifested itself during the dispute between the Finance Ministry and the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

National Bank of Poland over the rate of zloty devaluation. The leadership of the bank maintains that it obtained the prime minister's consent to its decision. The prime minister claims that he did not give such approval. Why were such discrediting misunderstandings not observed when Pawlak's predecessors were in power?

The fact that the prime minister has not yet made a decision on a new police chief has a destructive influence on the work and prestige of the police. The prime minister persists with the candidacy of Leszek Lamparski, who is a second-class invalid. Against the facts, he accused the Advisory Committee of not hearing what his protege had to say. The prime minister is hoping that, if Lamparski is examined once again, it will turn out that he is not at all an invalid. In other words, he is hoping that somehow, miraculously, he has become healthy again.

He also treated rather roughly Minister Andrzej Olechowski. He did not sign the plan of reforms in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been ready for a long time and which was to rationalize the work of the Polish diplomatic service.

The head of the government also bears responsibility for the pathetic information policy of his Cabinet. What is more, strangely enough, the prime minister is doing his best to ignore the mass media. His contempt for journalists also shows his contempt for the citizens.

"My evaluation of the prime minister is one of a man who moves just like a cat. If he feels he is about to meet with opposition, first he stands back, then leaps, and the issue is finished. In this way, he resolves controversial problems, and the result is favorable to him," says PSL Deputy Roman Jagielinski.

However, the prime minister can also do things quickly. He destroyed the powiat reform by claiming, against the calculations, that it would only increase bureaucracy. The result was positive—for him. The real reason for Pawlak's decision was the following: Powiats might weaken the PSL's position in the regions. Equally quickly, he curbed the pilotage program for towns, necessary to carry out the self-governmental reform. By appointing PSL activists to many regional administrative posts, Pawlak strengthened his own position in the party.

He went to great lengths to see to it that PSL-linked Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej receive additional financing from taxpayers' money. He did not delay his decision to introduce barrier tariffs for food, which helped him strengthen his authority among rural voters.

Prime Minister Pawlak does not have a vision of the direction of developments in Poland, says Freedom Union Deputy Andrzej Potocki. "The Jan Olszewski government had bad concepts, but still, it had them. The opposition was able to present its own vision against the government's vision. Now, in the case of the Pawlak government, being in opposition lies in opposing not the direction of changes but inactivity, inertia, and lack of activity."

Deputy Potocki is wrong. Waldemar Pawlak does have a vision. This vision is the prosperity of Waldemar Pawlak, a politician for whom his own aim justifies the means.

His supporters recall that he is still very popular with the people. However, popularity cannot be the ultimate criterion for assessing whether someone is the right person to head the state. Was the popularity of, for example, Stan Tyminski, a man from nowhere, a sufficient recommendation for him to take over the office of president of the Polish Republic?

Against the activities of the prime minister, thanks to the policy of the previous governments and the persistence of some ministers, Poland is entering a period in which its economic outlook is good. However, the fact that Pawlak is stepping on the brake pedal and causing the governmental vehicle to skid uncontrollably may spell the end of our chance to depict Poland as a stable country in which the government knows what it wants and in which one can invest one's money safely.

Waldemar Pawlak is the worst head of government in five years.

Walesa, Pawlak Discuss Economy, Police Candidacy

LD2609151794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1342 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 26 Sep—President Lech Walesa met today with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak at the presidential palace. The visit lasted nearly one and one-half hours, Leszek Spalinski, the president's press spokesman, told a PAP journalist.

During the meeting, the prime minister briefed the president on the results of his visit to China, especially in connection with his economic contacts.

It was agreed that the president will participate in the coming government meeting, which concerns the economy, in part.

The president's spokesman said that the talks focused particularly on economic issues. The issue of privatization, including the Program of General Privatization [PPP], was widely discussed. The president was concerned about the slow pace of the process. The prime minister said that it is not his intention to hold or delay the PPP. He said that the program should be implemented to the benefit of the economy and should not bring negative results.

The appointment of the main commandant of police was also raised. The prime minister said that he will submit the candidature of Krzysztof Dybiec to the interior minister and to the Interior Ministry advisory committee. The president said that he has no professional objections regarding this candidature.

Krzysztof Dybiec, former head of police at the Warsaw district of Praga-Polnoc, currently heads the Operations and Investigations Office in the General Inspectorate of Customs.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Columnist Comments on Conflict Within KRRiT

WS2609133794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Sep 94 p 2

[Commentary by Krzysztof Gottesman, under the "Observations" rubric]

[Text] Several days ago, the Supreme Administrative Court made its decision on PolSat, and President Lech Walesa made a decision to recall Marek Markiewicz and Maciej Ilowiecki from the posts of members of the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT]. The days that have passed since these decisions have been characterized by a rather monotonous discussion among politicians. The discussion actually boils down to an attempt to establish whether the president had the right to do what he did.

Politicians, most of them Sejm deputies, depending on their political affiliations, are speaking more or less authoritatively about an attempt on democracy, about attempts to destroy the independence of KRRiT. They are interpreting the law on their own.

However, in their statements, they do not draw attention to the fundamental problem, which, incidentally, has in fact given rise to this crisis. It is the deputies themselves who are most responsible for this. There would not have been any commotion caused by the recall of two KRRiT members or any other conflicts if the parliament had done well what it should have done well—that is, if it had worded the law in such a way as to prevent all activities and discussions that we are witnessing today.

Many lawyers have on various occasions drawn attention to the fact that the laws that leave the parliament—incidentally, not only the present parliament—are in many respects far from being perfect. They are often unclear. They allow more than one interpretation, and, as a consequence, instead of setting things in order, they complicate them. For this reason, the law, instead of regulating public life, often destabilizes it. The example concerning KRRiT is only one of many such instances.

Media Treatment of Military, Defense Issues

94EP0096B Warsaw WOJSKO I WYCHOWANIE in Polish No 8, Aug 94 pp 8-9

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Marek Piekarski, compiled on the basis of the study "The National Press on Military and Defense Topics," of the Analysis and Research Section of the Press and Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense: "The National Press and the Military and Defense"]

[Text] [In communist Poland until 1989] the military, national defense, military equipment, and military history were subjects that had always attracted the interest of the press. Depending on the article commissioned and the nature of the periodical, the authors selected sources of information, outlined the intended scope of the subject and adopted an approach suited to the situation (and the possibilities). But, of course, journalists could not always write about their real interests. Sometimes they lacked access to adequate and objective primary sources of information or at other times the topics of interest to them were of no interest to the publishers. It also happened that it was not the custom to write about certain issues. Here a complex whole of interrelationships was in operation. Frequently the interests of the journalist and the military proved to be mutually exclusive. Fairly often it was the censors who decided whether a topic would or would not see the light of the day. It was general knowledge as to who could write about the military, when, and in what form, and who could not do so or would be thought unseemly in doing so. One consequence of that particular situation was that, in principle, little was published about the military, and the few publications issued were generally of either a descriptive nature—ah, those splendid parades and military orchestras!—or of such a generalized nature as to say nothing. The monopoly on topics concerning the military and defense was placed "in the hands of" the military press, especially the Armed Forces daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI.

After 1989 the situation underwent a change that was as radical as it was significant. First, the censorship decree was abolished. Second, the military itself found that there is no greater advantage than providing in advance broad and competent information. At a time when practically any topic—almost—ceased to be taboo, journalists began as it were to rediscover military and defense topics. It turned out that such issues are intriguing, varied, and, for reasons mentioned above, relatively unknown. Interest in these issues has moreover been reinforced by the changes in the system of society and politics in this country. The battle for the military and for its nationalist nature, along with the campaign to debunk [communist] lies about Poland's modern history, including the history of its armed forces, as well as the new quality of foreign policy—as related to defense—all these events turned out to spur growing interest of the press in this domain of public life.

Then also other, natural factors attracted the attention of the press to the military. Namely, while the military was burdened with the odium of martial law, at the same time it still ranked among the institutions most trusted and accepted by the public. So then the military began to reform and change itself. The issue of conscientious objectors was no longer swept under the rug. Spectacular measures ensuing from the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and consisting in destroying withdrawn military equipment were commenced. The process of restoring original Polish national military traditions and transmitting them along with knowledge of Polish feats of arms as a legacy to the modern Polish military was initiated. And lastly there is perhaps the most interesting and totally new factor: Civilian politicians were appointed to head the Ministry of National Defense. As a result of all this, military and defense affairs became the subject of much more specific rather than generalized, and more open, spoken and written discussion. And although the Festival of Soldiers'

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Songs in Kolobrzeg has been abandoned as an institution, more attention has also been paid to military culture, if culture is to be divided into civilian and military.

Naturally, the military began to look at what the press is publishing about it. Its interest may have been dictated by vanity, by some anxiety, but above all by a need to know the facts as they are: What is attracting the attention of the press more and what less, and why, and what is being ignored by the press but in the military's opinion should not be ignored at all, and also which periodicals devote more space to it and which less, and which articles are valuable, objective, and specific, baring and criticizing facts, and which deserve to be classified among fairy tales. However, out of respect for freedom of speech and press, hasty assessments, condemnations, or other ways of expressing discontent have been avoided. At the same time, in order to gain the related knowledge, [the military] intensified its analytic work as based not only on mechanical counting and classification of publications dealing with the military and defense but also the development of certain recommendations (forecasts?) which are very useful in daily cooperation with journalists.

When an attempt was made to perform an elementary statistical analysis of the problem, it turned out that in the last four years the number of articles dealing with topics of interest to us has nearly sextupled.

Altogether, in 1990 about 3,000 articles on the military and defense were published (450 in the first quarter, 700 in the second, more than 870 in the third, and somewhat more than 900 in the fourth), meaning that their number had doubled within one year. This trend persevered in 1991 with the articles published in the first quarter totaling more than 950; in the second, 1,000; in the third, 970; and in the fourth, more than 1,200. Altogether, some 4,200 articles were published in that year [1991], that is, [almost] one and one-half times as many as in 1990. But as it turned out that was only the beginning of a real boom, because a year later, in 1992, their number soared to 10,400, that is, about 2.5 times as many as in the preceding year and nearly 3.5 times as many as in 1990. In a breakdown by quarterly period this amounted to: In the first quarter, 2,500; in the second, 2,300; in the third, 2,100; and in the fourth, 3,500. This trend persisted in 1993, when nearly 18,000 articles (or nearly six times as many as in 1990!) on these subjects were published (4,400 in the first quarter, 3,800 in the second, 4,700 in the third, and more than 4,500 in the fourth).

Given such figures—and even without disputing whether they are 100 percent credible and complete, or whether they correspond to the truth only three-fourths, this precisely being the charm of statistics—a list of rankings was tentatively prepared. It turned out that last year among the dailies the leader in publishing articles and reports on military topics was GAZETA WYBORCZA (inclusive of its regional issues) with about 1,800 articles and reports, followed by RZECZPOSPOLITA with about 1,450 and ZYCIE WARSZAWY with about 1,100. Among the regional dailies CZAS KRAKOWSKI ranks first with some 700 articles. Of the weeklies, POLITYKA most often concerns itself with military and defense topics (about 185 articles), followed by NIE (about 160) and WPROST (about 140).

It turned out that last year the largest group of the related articles dealt with international aspects of Polish security and defense (about 2,500 articles), followed by articles dealing with military history and feats, both old and new (about 2,100). Domestic aspects and conditions of national security and defense were the subject of some 2,000 articles. The least number of articles dealt with the direct activities of the Ministry of National Defense as the central government agency involved.

Polish-German Trade Chamber Established

MM2609134194 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 17-18 Sep 94 p 3

[PAP-attributed article, signed "AAD": "David and Goliath? Development of Polish-German Commercial Cooperation"]

[Text] A Polish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce has been established in Warsaw. It is headed by Chairman Jan Kulczycki. Its founders are 196 Polish and German banks and companies engaged in commercial and industrial activity oriented toward the markets of both countries.

The chamber was set up with the aim of promoting Polish-German commercial and economic contacts. In addition to other briefs, it will protect its members' interests in contacts with Polish and German Government institutions. The chamber will set up and support commercial contacts between the two countries and collect and supply information on their economic situation. There are also plans for the development of economic consultancy facilities and the preparation of economic appraisals and reports on sale and investment opportunities in both countries. The chamber will organize trade fairs and training and arbitrate in disputes arising from trade contacts between Polish and German firms.

Our 1993 trade turnover with Germany was approximately 18.4 billion German marks [DM], which gave that country a 32-percent share in our foreign trade. This represented an increase of 11 percent on 1992. For some years now, gradually closer trade contacts have been recorded between our two countries. In 1991, the "Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation Between the Polish Republic and the German Federal Republic" also defined the nature of our economic relations. In March of this year, the Polish-German Society for Economic Promotion was set up. In addition, German banks have contributed to our obtaining such favorable terms of our debt reduction with the London Club.

It should, however, be remembered that Poland's share in Germany's foreign trade turnover amounts to a mere 1.55 percent, while the extent of German investment in Poland is estimated at DM840 million, which places our

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Western neighbor only fourth after the United States, Italy, and international corporations. In Germany, the best opportunities for economic contacts with Poland are perceived in regional and border cooperation.

Social Policy Action Guidelines Presented

94EP0094A Warsaw PRZEGLAD RZADOWY in Polish No 5, May 94 pp 77-83

[An official Government-of-Poland document drafted in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and approved by the Council of Ministers in May 1994: "Social Policy Action Guidelines"]

[Text] The "Social Policy Action Guidelines" drafted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy take into account, inter alia, the results thus far of negotiations [in the Tripartite Commission (trade unions-employers-the government)] on levels of guaranteed social benefits. This program will serve to complement the draft outline of social and economic policies covering the period 1994-97 ["Strategy for Poland"] which the government intends to endorse and transmit to the Sejm in June.

* * *

Building a new political system and a market economy must be accompanied by changes in the principles, mechanisms, and institutions of the social policy of the state. Essentially these changes should reduce to assigning an equal role to the two fundamental purposes of social policy, namely: protection, that is, providing citizens with a specific level of social protection, and equality of opportunity, that is, making it possible to restore a situation in which income can be derived by working and thereby the welfare applicant can become independent.

The principal directions of the reform of social policy should comprise:

—First, a close correlation of social and economic policies. Social policy cannot be reduced solely to measures intended to alleviate such consequences of the transformations as the growing extent of destitution, perpetuation of structural unemployment, and deterioration of the state of public health, but it also must affect economic decisions by taking into consideration their social consequences.

In Poland we have approached the limit of social tranquility owing to problems associated with labor, and the narrowing of employment possibilities is a real danger to public finance by contributing to the crisis in the activities of social services institutions and necessitating restrictions of the right to monetary entitlements. Labor should now become the principal criterion of social policy, because it is the source of economic growth and of the possibilities for funding social spending.

—Second, economic rationalization, that is, the development of criteria and mechanisms defining the directions of the spending of limited resources on the pursuit of social objectives agreed upon with social partners. This requires working out a system of social indicators for analyzing the course of socioeconomic processes and evaluating the effectiveness of social policy.

—Third, decentralization, meaning a "downward shift" of the administration of social policy from the central level to the regional and local levels.

—Fourth, the introduction of organizational pluralism serving to accelerate the process of the establishment of public organizations as partners of the national government and local governments in obtaining and distributing monies for funding social services and solving local social problems.

—Fifth, a change in the model for allocation of social benefits by abandoning discretionary modes of action in favor of granting to citizens the objective right to welfare benefits, a right that can be claimed.

—Sixth, a broader introduction of the social insurance system as the principal means of funding social protection, as based on contributions from employers and employees. Such a method of financing affords the opportunity for righting the relationship between economic policy and social policy and it will situate labor better as the principal source of economic growth and social spending.

—Seventh, the application of the principle of trilateral dialogue among representatives of trade unions, employer organizations, and the government when programming and pursuing social objectives and ways of achieving them.

Labor

A system of labor which, while providing employees with safeguards of fundamental employee rights, will provide employers with freedom of action, is to be purposely built. The introduction of such a model requires a radical, though staggered, reform of labor legislation resulting in so-called recodification of labor laws. Labor laws would define the extent of state intervention by, chiefly, specifying the minimum norms of protection and the maximum limits of the obligations of employees. During the first stage of this reform amendments to the Labor Law Code have already been drafted, regulating problems associated with collective bargaining agreements and safety and hygiene of labor. Social services at workplaces have also been covered by new legal regulations.

Assigning a new role to collective bargaining agreements will radically alter the government's role in shaping labor legislation. That is because the rights and privileges of employees will be chiefly determined by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement and by the parties to the individual employment contract. As for the government, on its part it will support the bargaining process and monitor adherence to law by employers and employees. Primacy in protecting the employee will belong to labor legislation at the expense of direct regulation of labor relations by the government.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

In conditions of economic growth adaptation to the requirements of international standards, such as those defined by the International Organization of Labor, is essential, along with adjustment to the universal level of employee rights defined by the state in the Labor Law Code and the attendant implementing regulations.

Collective bargaining agreements will regulate wage terms and fringe benefits. The machinery of collective bargaining, intended to conclude a collective bargaining agreement, will be the principal factor in wage policy. At the workplaces where, for various reasons, the provisions of the appropriate bargaining agreements do not apply, the employer will specify wage guidelines in printed in-house rules. This will serve to monitor the related rights of the employer. The powers left to the minister of labor and social policy will include the power to fix the minimum wage. At the same time, the revised Labor Law Code will introduce the rule that the agencies of the state and the employer (each within its own scope) should endeavor to set wages at a decent level. Labor should provide an income serving to support one's family at an average level at least, which will restrict the scope of discretionary social benefits.

In recent years there has been a steep decline in civil service salaries and retirement pensions, both in real terms and as compared with the wages paid in the entrepreneurial sector. Thus while in the years 1989-90 there was no wage gap between these sectors, estimates for 1994 indicate that for this year as a whole civil servants will be paid about 82 percent—and in the fourth quarter about 70 percent—compared with the earnings in the entrepreneurial sector. It is worth noting that in 1993 the average retirement pension amounted to 83.6 percent of the average salary of civil servants.

The reorientation toward socially useful functions of the civil service promoting the operation and growth of the manufacturing sector does not justify, even despite the limited possibilities of the state budget, tolerating the continuing decline in the earnings of civil servants. This decline should be counteracted through a gradual approach for which appropriate legislative safeguards should be enacted.

The problem of the internal proportions of salaries within the civil service system itself requires straightening. In particular, it will be necessary to:

—Establish a yardstick or yardsticks for the internal differentiation of salaries; an alternative solution could be the acceptance of the principle that salary proportions will be determined through negotiation.

—Define the time limit for the existing salary schedules.

—Specify the deadline for revising the salary schedules.

—Determine whether and how the revisions of salary schedules within the civil service will be affected by the presupposed organizational changes in education and health care.

The above applies to the national government. In the case of local governments the assumption is that, as in the past, they have autonomy in procuring and allocating funds for payments of salaries from their own budgets.

Salary guidelines will be determined in collective bargaining agreements: for employees of state budget units, in ministry-wide agreements concluded by the appropriate minister; and for employees of the budget units of local governments, in gmina- [township-, or smallest administrative unit od loxal government] and departmental-level agreements. For the state employees who are not included in ministry-wide agreements—to the extent to which they are not covered by other agencies—salary guidelines will be determined by the minister of labor and social policy. It is expected that these guidelines will be refined and more flexible.

The proposed revisions of the Labor Law Code strengthen the standing of the employee vis a vis the employer and add to his rights by defining, among other things, the rules for the establishment and termination of employment relationship, the maximum number of daily and weekly hours of work, the length of the pay period, the admissibility of specified work timetables and overtime work, the minimum length of vacations, rules of safety and hygiene of labor, regulations protecting the work of women and youth, and the filing of claims for unjustified or illegal discharge from employment.

Other revisions of the Labor Law Code will include mandatory standards of employee rights, broadening the existing rights in that respect. Some employee rights will be provided with safeguards at the level specified by international standards, especially by the conventions and recommendations of the ILO. This concerns in particular the regulations governing safety and hygiene of labor as well as vacations. Protective standards for number of hours worked will be tightened, and at the same time the parties to collective bargaining agreements as well as employers outside such agreements will be afforded the freedom to decide upon a flexible work schedule, inclusive of specific hourly work schedules.

Growth of employment and maintenance of unemployment at a socially accepted level are paramount objectives of economic and social policy. The causes of the rise in unemployment in recent years are traceable to economic processes. Thus, the rate at which the unemployment problem is solved will be determined chiefly by the course of these processes. Hence also the unemployment problem must be considered when taking economic policy decisions.

Measures intended to maintain and promote occupational activity will be introduced as part of so-called active forms of counteracting unemployment, and hence the following objectives have to be accomplished:

—Development of forms of temporary employment supporting occupational activity.

—Adaptation of vocational education to the needs of the labor market.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

—Expansion of the training and retraining of adults.

—Expansion of a vocational counseling system.

These measures require increased spending on effective forms of counteracting unemployment. It is estimated that, given the current rule for dividing spending from the Labor Fund on active measures and on unemployment benefits, at least 20 percent should be spent on active forms of combatting unemployment (the 1994 Budget Law specifies them at the level of 13 percent of that Fund).

In this connection the system for funding active and passive forms of counteracting unemployment has to be radically altered. Along with the introduction of unemployment insurance (which will be gradually introduced starting in 1996), a separate fund for financing active forms of combatting unemployment will be established. It will be funded chiefly from the state budget, voluntary contributions by workplaces and local governments, and contributions by various organizations and institutions. That fund will serve to finance programs for active combatting of unemployment, such as job retraining, public works, creation of new jobs, employment of school graduates, counteracting eventual reductions in force, etc. A variety of programs and measures will be undertaken to assist various social groups and local labor markets which are threatened by particularly high unemployment, e.g., programs for jobless youth and school graduates, for longtime jobseekers, for the disabled, and for persons discharged from employment owing to sector restructuring, as well as regional programs.

The Social Safety Net

The social safety net is created by both a system of social benefits delivered on an insurance basis and on the basis of entitlements as well as public assistance [welfare] benefits and other arrangements made for the purpose of protecting personal living standards (inclusive of health care and education). The extent of the social safety net depends chiefly on the financial possibilities of the state. This system, based on institutional-legal foundations, is intended to avert situations of dearth or insufficiency of the material means needed to meet the minimum basic subsistence needs of individuals or families.

The effectiveness of the social safety net hinges on, in particular:

—Properly determined interrelationship of discrete elements of the net and their mutual cohesiveness.

—As above with respect to economic possibilities.

—The level, as defined by that net, of the state's obligations (guarantees) to its citizens.

A social safety net providing indispensable social benefits in the event of loss of income, low earnings, or an unexpected rise in needs, is the basis for the feeling of personal security among members of society. In view of the fact that discrete elements of that net are geared to providing protection against discrete kinds of so-called social risk, only the system as a whole determines the extent of the protection provided by that net.

In the future an extensive system of social insurance should be the foundation for the whole of the social safety net, for it is this that applies to a majority of aspects of the most frequent kinds of social risk. Hence, a properly ramified and efficiently operating social insurance system that provides most of the social benefits assures the "durability" of the entire social safety net. Above all, however, it counteract any excessive growth in the number of welfare recipients. Public assistance [welfare] is of a supplementary nature so far as social insurance or the entitlements system is concerned, because it covers cases in which neither social benefits nor entitlements can be paid, or it may supplement these payments as well.

Guarantees of the Level of Basic Benefits

The determination of the minimum level of benefits is intended to provide a protective shield assuring the society of elementary social protection. Hence also the minimum level of benefits is and shall remain guaranteed by the state, which initiates and takes measures intended to protect that level.

A major element of measures to protect earnings from labor is the government-determined and legally guaranteed minimum wage. Laws in effect ensure that employees paid less than the minimum wage receive monthly compensation raising their overall monthly income to the mandatory minimum wage level. As the system of collective bargaining agreements becomes refined, the minimum wage assumed in these agreements may not be lower than the legally mandatory nationwide minimum wage.

An important element of the policy of alleviating the consequences of unemployment is the system of unemployment benefits providing the unemployed with a minimum living allowance for a legally specified period of time.

The social insurance system is, in view of its mandatory nature, one of the most important social safeguards provided by the state to employees. The obligation of paying the social insurance premium engenders the right to benefit from a social insurance pension in the event specified situations arise. In the case of benefits whose amount varies with individual income from work, the introduction of a social insurance minimum is intended to ensure a minimum income level in cases in which the benefits reckoned on the basis of an individual's past earnings alone do not suffice to ensure such a level.

Persons or families existing in a difficult material situation who are incapable of resolving it with their own resources alone can be eligible for public assistance [welfare], which is intended to fill the gaps that arise considering that not all persons or families derive income from labor or from annuities or retirement pensions or when their income is insufficient. The principal criterion for granting welfare benefits is thus whether a family's (per person) income is below the minimum retirement pension. In addition to the

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

income criterion, other factors affecting a family's situation are taken into consideration, such as orphaning, homelessness, need for maternity protection, joblessness, physical or mental disability, prolonged illness, inability to cope with child care or child upbringing or with managing a household, especially in large families and in the case of single parents, alcoholism or drug abuse, difficulty in adjusting to normal life following release from incarceration, and natural or economic disasters. For these reasons, public assistance is addressed to individual recipients depending on their particular situations, and the maximum amount of benefits that can be granted is legally specified.

The possibility of introducing benefits termed "minimum guaranteed income" is being considered. This concept applies to benefits intended to supplement personal incomes so as to raise them to the level guaranteed by the state. Persons with incomes below a specified threshold would be eligible for social benefits payable in an amount equal to the difference between guaranteed income and the income actually derived from other sources by the recipient.Thus, under the guaranteed income system, benefits would be of the compensatory kind. However, the guarantee of "minimum guaranteed income" is not tantamount to an obligation to automatically equalize incomes; it merely signifies the possibility of applying for income assistance only when other, legally prescribed requirements are met, in particular those pertaining to work ability. Complementing these measures is nonmonetary assistance, addressed especially to children, such as counseling and assistance in education and rehabilitation.

Trade unions are demanding that the level of "minimum guaranteed income" be correlated with the social minimum. Given the difficulty of determining the objective value of the social minimum and the eventual correlation index, such a solution may burden the state budget with unrealistic assessments.

Social Insurance

The principal purpose of the reform of the social insurance system in Poland is to provide the recipients, pensioners and annuitants, with mandatory social insurance benefits meeting their basic needs of pensioners and annuitants so as to leave them free to achieve a higher standard of living through personal resourcefulness, by deriving additional income from, e.g., personal retirement funds. The changes in the ways in which the individual can achieve this goal will be accompanied by changes intended to ensure universal adherence to a broadly conceived principle of equal treatment of all persons covered, from the standpoint of aspects other than the insurance risk and at the same time adequate treatment as regards the insurance risk from the standpoint of the size of the insurance premium. The attainment of the desired model will be preceded by introducing changes rationalizing eligibility for the benefits and thereby stabilizing the financial management of insurance. Self-financing of social insurance is assumed.

The economic recession has resulted in a marked decline in employment (i.e., in the number of the insured) which, combined, with excessively liberal requirements for eligibility for benefits and the rapid increase in the number of recipients, has caused social insurance to experience an acute financial crisis. For while as recently as in 1990 the 45-percent premium sufficed to cover benefits, already in 1992 the size of premium needed to cover the benefits should have been 51.7 percent; in 1995 it will increase to 59.2 percent; and in 2005 it will exceed 64 percent. These figures illustrate the scale of this trend and point to the need to accelerate systemic revisions of the social insurance system.

These revisions should include:

—Elimination of family benefits, childbirth benefits, and child-rearing benefits from social insurance benefits and their reclassification as universal social benefits funded from the state budget. Such a reclassification will make possible improved addressing of these needs and a more rational utilization of the funds allocated for these purposes.

—Introduction of new rules for the payment of illness and maternity benefits. The new solutions would basically consist in:

a) Making benefit payments independent of the mode of ownership [state or private] of the workplace.

b) Making the employer financially responsible for five weeks of absence due to illness in the calendar year, i.e., assuring the employee of the right to receive at least 80 percent of his normal pay during that period.

c) Making the insurance institution (the Social Security Fund) financially responsible for periods of illness exceeding five weeks in the calendar year.

—Introduction of a new accident insurance system based on:

a) Making the payment of benefits independent of the mode of ownership [state or private] of the workplace.

b) Differentiated premiums, depending on occupational safety in a given workplace.

—Development of a two-tier system of retirement pensions and annuities, with the first tier based on the principle of combining social factors with insurance factors and the second making the amount of benefits granted directly proportional to the amount and duration of the premiums paid (rule of reciprocity).

—Isolation of discrete insurance funds for discrete classes of benefits: retirement fund, illness fund, and accident fund. This would result in different premium rates for different kinds of insurance risk.

—Shared employee-employer payments of retirement and accident insurance premiums. In the case of accident insurance the premium would be entirely paid by employer, with its amount differentiated depending on the occupational hazard (risk) at a given

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

workplace, as ensuing from working conditions. Technically speaking the implementation of this project would require another payroll deduction (by analogy with the deduction instituted upon the enactment of the [personal] income tax) and, moreover, the premiums deducted from the employee's pay for the other kinds of social insurance would then, while retained, have to be correspondingly lowered.

—Introduction of a nationwide system for keeping records of periods of insurance (individual policy cards. This would serve to divide the payment of the insurance premium between the employee and the employer as well to modify the duty of insurance regardless of the nature of the legal relationship (employment contract, commission, work agreement), etc.

—Updating the organizational and legal status of the Social Insurance Administration (ZUS) and determination of the role and functions of the supervising councils attached to the ZUS, with the object of increasing the influence of policyholders on the performance of that institution.

Retirement Funds Based on Public Law Principles

—With the object of affording conditions that encourage the insured to be personally more resourceful, organizational-legal foundations for the establishment and operation of (plant, subsector, national) retirement funds based on principles of public law are to be worked out. Unlike in the case of mandatory basic insurance, membership in these funds would be voluntary and their choice would be up to the insured.

—The possibility of a provisionally tax-exempt individual retirement account ["IRA"], will also be considered. The decision to open this kind of savings account would be up to the individual taxpayer. The amount deposited in that account (up to a specified yearly limit) would be tax exempt until the 65th year of age. The monies saved in that account could be withdrawn in toto or in installments (pension) after the depositor reaches 65 years of age (and upon withdrawal would be subject to the then applicable taxation rates). Such IRA funds would be managed pursuant to specific legal guidelines.

The preparations for a purposive reform will be promoted by interim solutions providing the basis for more extensive institutional reforms. Translating these solutions into reality will serve to balance the social insurance budget, as funded in real terms from the state budget, for the next few years. These solutions include:

—The introduction of new guidelines for disability rulings; under the new concept, persons with total disability would be eligible for an indefinite disability pension, while persons with partial disability would be eligible, on specific terms and for a specific period of time, for correspondingly lower disability benefits. The introduction of these new guidelines must be accompanied by a rehabilitation system that covers the insured from the onset of illness until the eventual ruling of total work disability.

—the introduction of changes that would radically streamline the current eligibility requirements for retirement pension in cases of work in special [arduous] conditions or of a special nature.

—The establishment of an earlier retirement age for persons holding objectively necessary jobs of a special nature or in special conditions.

—The possibility of work-seniority preferences for persons working underground or working in direct contact with asbestos, lead, cadmium, etc.

—The application of these preferences to an extent proportional to duration of employment in cases of jobs in nonpreferred conditions.

—The introduction of changes in the ongoing indexing of retirement pensions and annuities so as to preserve the real worth of the benefits. Basically, increases in these pensions and annuities would be indexed not to wage increases as at present but to price increases or, more broadly, to increases in the cost of living. This change would, given the presumed wage increases, serve to improve the financial management of social insurance in the near future.

—The introduction of changes in the [age] eligibility of women for retirement pensions, i.e., the equalization of terms of eligibility for women and men. This change should be implemented on the premise that all the women who became eligible for retirement pensions in the period previous to the introduction of the new solutions remain so eligible, and moreover establishing a longer minimum retirement age and minimum duration of work seniority for the other women would take place gradually, say, over five or 10 years. When revising the existing requirements for pension eligibility to be met by women, the question of granting partial retirement pensions to persons who reached retirement age but whose length of employment (period of insurance) ranges from 15 to 25 years has to be considered. In addition, as regards the currently adopted base periods for determining the size of retirement pensions and annuities, the possibility of picking a base period of 20 optimal (in terms of wages earned) years out of the entire period of insurance should be considered.

Unemployment Insurance

As unemployment grows and persists, providing social protection to employees threatened by layoffs and to the unemployed is becoming a major problem. The existing legal solutions in this field have to be replaced by an unemployment insurance system. This will serve to streamline the expenditures on alleviating the adverse consequences of unemployment and at the same time to

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

reinforce the active forms of counteracting unemployment. Such a system would provide the unemployed with benefits adjusted to length of employment and the amount of the wages earned in the last period of employment.

Organizationally speaking, introducing an unemployment insurance system would require establishing two separate funds: The Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Occupational Activation Fund. The income of the Unemployment Insurance Fund should entirely derive from premiums paid by employees and employers. Benefits would be paid only to the unemployed who are insured. The state budget would be the guarantor of solvency of the Fund. The premiums payable to that fund would be paid two-thirds by employers and one-third by employees. The unemployment insurance system must be supported by government measures intended to aid those unemployed persons who for various reasons are not eligible for unemployment benefits, have forfeited that eligibility, or are not covered by the mandatory system of unemployment insurance (e.g., school graduates, persons discharged from military service, persons who remain jobless for a long time in regions with particularly high unemployment, etc.).

The amendments currently being incorporated in the Law on Employment and Unemployment will serve to change more extensively the system of social protection of the unemployed (e.g., a precise definition of the unemployed).

Social Benefits From the Entitlements System

The changes in the socioeconomic system are affecting most painfully the economically weakest families and individuals. The limited financial resources that can be allocated for the support of the most destitute persons require concentrating various forms of assistance on the neediest persons and families. The measures already taken to bring order into the social insurance system will promote a more rational spending of resources from the entitlements system.

For the immediate future the following measures are envisaged:

—Replacement of family allowances, childbirth allowances, child-care allowances, and maternity and child-rearing allowances, with an integrated system of family allowances, entirely funded from the state budget.

—The introduction of the supplementary social income.

The System of Family Allowances

A new system providing for comprehensive regulation of family allowances will be introduced. Allowances will be granted to the families whose material situation requires additional assistance, this will apply chiefly to pregnant women and mothers with neonates. Among other things, the following allowances are envisaged:

—Family allowances only for the families in which income per family member does not exceed 40 percent of average wage, with the allowance per family member increased to 250,000 zlotys [monthly].

—Child-rearing allowances for working families whose income per member last year did not exceed 25 percent of the average wage last year.

—Additional cash allowances intended chiefly for the protection of maternity and assistance for neonates, for low-income families.

—Indexing these benefits to the indicator of price increases (cost-of-living indicator).

The Supplementary Social Income

Supplementary social income payments will be introduced especially for persons who are unable to work owing to age or disability but are not eligible for social-insurance benefits. At first these payments would be granted to persons unable to work owing to disability incurred before the 18th year of age (at present such persons receive a regular allowance). Eligibility for the supplementary social income will be gradually broadened as the state's economic situation improves.

Public Assistance

The public assistance [welfare] system is a highly important element of the social safety net. In recent years, as unemployment increased and the living standards of a large segment of society dropped, the tasks of the public assistance service have been increasing. Along with the progress of reforms of social insurance and the broadening of entitlements, the public assistance system should also be transformed. This concerns the scope of the available benefits and organizational forms. This should result in adapting needs to social expectations. These changes will be based on defining the extent of responsibility of the national government, local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens who are clients of the public assistance system.

It should be an obligation of the welfare applicant to actively attempt to overcome his difficult situation, to be ready to take steps to end his reliance on welfare, and to cooperate with the social worker. The attitude of the welfare applicant should be a prerequisite on which providing him with various forms of assistance depends.

The Law on Public Assistance is designed to assign the principal role in the provision of welfare assistance to local governments inasmuch as these are obligated and responsible for the fate and conditions of existence of the members of their communities. The duties and tasks of the gminas should include:

—Provision of material, financial, and periodic or one-time assistance to persons who cannot improve their situation through their own efforts owing to illness or disability and whose incomes do not meet their needs for subsistence.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

—Expansion of service-providing institutions for incapacitated, chronically ill, and disabled persons, so as to counteract the placement of these persons in special homes. This is important for both economic and humanitarian reasons.

—Establishment of regional or local social protection programs addressed to persons and constituencies needing additional support in particular situations and times. Whenever such programs are found to be effective and the local gmina or community is experiencing financial problems, such measures should be supported from the state budget.

—Strengthening the organization of public assistance by linking public assistance centers to a network of nongovernmental organizations complementing the activities of national government and local governments or implementing objectives as commissioned by the state; the services provided by these organizations should meet the needs of local communities and the objectives they implement as commissioned by the state should be based on contracts between them and the state.

Government guarantees ensuring the maintenance of the individual and the family at the so-called minimum subsistence level should be viewed as a general objective of public assistance.

Changes in the public assistance system should be in line with the proposed general trend—thus resulting in a more effective solution of problems—as should be changes in local self-help movements and nongovernmental organizations. The state should support such actions organizationally and financially. The scope of social benefits should be complemented by measures serving to legitimize nongovernmental centers of public assistance. At present child-care homes, homes for the aged, etc., are generally government-operated, with only a few being managed by monastic orders. The social policy with regard to the growth of institutional forms of assistance should be pursued in the direction of transferring such centers to management by nongovernmental organizations or even by private individuals, with government support and at the same time issuing regulations governing the level of care provided by such centers (so-called standardization, licensing).

In this situation, decisions have to be taken concerning:

—The definition of the role and scope of the social insurance system and, in that context, of other social benefits.

—The definition of the role and scope of activities relating to public assistance and the entitlements system.

—The definition of the concept of guaranteed income, including:

a) The level—the problem of determining the low-income boundary—of the poverty line (the social minimum).

b) The scope of guaranteed income (what is guaranteed and in what situation—the criteria).

c) Means of guaranteeing income (through public assistance in present conditions or through the tax system in the future).

Steps taken to improve the social safety net in its current form should be treated as a kind of social contract under which the state obligates itself to prevent any decline in incomes (consumption) below a certain level.

And hence the most urgent objectives include:

—Introducing the institution of the supplementary social income which, on being implemented in stages, would assure accessibility of systemic social security to persons who are incapable of work owing to disability or age and at the same time ineligible for retirement pensions or annuities.

—Transforming family allowances into (noninsurance) social benefits for families with low incomes.

—Implementing an integrated system of housing assistance for low-income families (housing allowances complementing welfare benefits, communal construction).

Only a rapid achievement of these objectives will make it possible to continue the social dialogue about purposive approaches to the social safety net in Poland.

The directions of the reforms of social policy as measured by the scope of powers of the minister of labor and social policy have to be considered from a broader standpoint. Pointing to the interrelationships inherent in that policy is the proper way of eliminating parochialism in the operating principles and objectives of other ministries. Awareness of the existence of such interrelationships among the subjects of social policy also affords an opportunity for developing a comprehensive program for social development.

Hence also the primacy of the institutions responsible for pursuing social policy cannot be measured solely by the criterion of the resourcefulness of one minister or another in acquiring the funding for the operations of his ministry. What is needed is deeper reflection, departure from spectacular solutions. Every ministry of state should guide its policy by the belief that it is a link in the chain contributing to the success of social reforms.

Accordingly, changes in the interministerial information policy are a prerequisite, as is inscribing interdependence as a canon in the government socioeconomic program.

The above article does not present a comprehensive approach to measures taken in the sphere of social policy, as it is concerned only with the domains within the competences of the minister of labor and social policy.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Iliescu Calls Talks With Clinton 'Significant'

AU2709093894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 27 Sep 94

["Exclusive" statement by Romanian President Ion Iliescu following his talks with President Bill Clinton in New York on 26 September—recorded]

[Text] First President Clinton emphasized his personal interest —it was his initiative that we should meet here—his personal and the U.S. administration's interest in furthering the positive evolution of bilateral relations between our countries. He highlighted precisely these elements: that they are following the positive evolutions within Romanian society, namely the consolidation of the democratic processes in the rule-of-law state, the promotion of a market economy, the internal stability of Romania, as well as its active role as a factor for stability in our region.

A more synthetic expression of the interest shown by the United States and President Clinton may have been the formulation that he used, namely that we consider your successes to be our own successes. Hence their interest in strengthening and furthering bilateral relations.

For our part, we saluted and emphasized the personal merit of President Clinton and the Clinton administration in the evolution of our bilateral relations over the past years, we saluted the outcome of them granting us the most-favored-nation status, which over the past year has resulted in an almost 50-percent increase in the volume of our trade and the activation of U.S. capital in Romania, which today ranks number one. We emphasized that we consider all this just a first step, as the results, on the whole, are still modest as compared with the potential that we think could be turned to good account in the future, a view that was also shared by President Clinton.

We expressed our hope that the U.S. Administration will continue to act to extend the validity of the status not just for one year, but rather over an unlimited period of time, a point that was taken by President Clinton, who displayed a responsiveness and a willingness to support the achievement of that goal.

In addition, we also held a dialogue in connection with the situation in Yugoslavia and the peace plan suggested by the Contact Group. I also briefed him on the talks that I had held with President Izetbegovic and Romania's interest, as well as the contacts that we have with both parties, in playing a useful role in finding solutions to facilitate the implementation of the peace plan, which was welcomed by President Clinton. We also expressed our common interest in granting support to the positive tendencies that may be seen, as well as to those forces that are working toward settling the conflict.

At the conclusion of our talks, we invited President Clinton to visit Romania, and there seemed to be such a possibility by the end of the current year, when he might attend the CSCE summit, or perhaps at another time acceptable for the U.S. President. Our invitation was received with pleasure.

I believe that we may assess the climate of our talks, as well as their essence and their contents, as significant for the level of relations achieved between Romania and the United States.

Foreign Office Minister Hogg Arrives in Bucharest

AU2609154294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] A short while ago, Mr. Douglas Hogg, minister in Great Britain's Foreign Office, arrived in Bucharest.

Later this afternoon, Mr. Hogg is to hold talks with Mr. Marcel Dinu, state secretary in Romania's Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Tomorrow, Mr. Hogg will travel to Chisinau [Republic of Moldova]. He is to continue his talks with the members of the Romanian Government on 28 September, which is the last day of his visit to our country, our correspondent Eugen Baboi reports.

Talks With Dinu, Nastase

AU2609201794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Mr. Douglas Hogg, minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, had a first round of talks with Mr. Marcel Dinu, secretary of state at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Ministry's headquarters this afternoon. The talks dealt with the stage of bilateral relations, Romania's relations with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and our country's relations with Hungary, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. Douglas Hogg told the press that President Ion Iliescu's visit to Great Britain, scheduled to take place at the start of next November, is awaited with great interest in London. Great Britain attaches particular importance to the relations with Romania, both in the political and economic fields, Mr. Douglas Hogg said, adding that the British Government supports Romania's aspiration for integration in the European and Euro- Atlantic structures. He also said that everything depends on the convergence of the economic and political strategy—our correspondent reports.

This afternoon, Mr. Adrian Nastase, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, received Mr. Douglas Hogg, secretary of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The talks mainly focussed on the stage of bilateral relations, with emphasis on the political and economic spheres. The guests expressed their interest in developing these ties, in view of the Romanian head of state's forthcoming visit to Great Britain. The guests also inquired about Romania's relations with the Republic of

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Moldova. In this respect, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies said that these ties have cooled down somewhat of late, mainly due to the attitude of the Chisinau authorities. The meeting was attended by Andrew Philip Bache, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Great Britain to Bucharest, and Mr. Marcel Dinu, secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—our correspondent, Gabi Benescu, reports.

PNTCD Leader Says Letter to U.S. 'Mistake'

AU2609161694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Ion Diaconescu, first vice president of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], during a news conference of his party held today, reiterated the idea that the parliamentarians letter, which asks the U.S. administration to cancel the appointment of the U.S. ambassador to Bucharest, represents a big political mistake. In this context, Mr. Ion Diaconescu announced that PNTCD Senator Matei Boila was given a vote of censure as a disciplinary punishment.

Today, First Vice President Ion Diaconescu, together with PNTCD General Secretary Valentin Gabrielescu, will go to the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest to present an official apology on behalf of the PNTCD leadership.

In connection the information published in the press, according to which the PNTCD President Corneliu Coposu's state of health has worsened, Mr. Ion Diaconescu called the information mere speculation. On the contrary, he said, the pulmonary problems have improved and currently the PNTCD president only has a slight indisposition caused by the appearance of zona zoster on his left arm.

The speaker announced that PNTCD President Corneliu Coposu will return to Bucharest in order to participate in a symposium on 8-9 October devoted to the reestablishment of the truth about the 23 August 1944 events. In the same context, Mr. Ion Diaconescu categorically rejected the idea that has been circulated lately, according to which a struggle has broken out within the PNTCD for succession to the leadership of the party.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Postponement of Arms Embargo Exemption Urged

LD2709083894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0013 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] New York, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim Ambassador to the United Nations Muhamed Sacirbey Monday urged the exemption of his government from the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia be postponed.

Sacirbey suddenly called a press conference and said the Sarajevo government still urged that a draft resolution on their exemption from the embargo be presented at the U.N. Security Council, but that its implementation should now be postponed for 4-6 months.

In an evident effort to make things easy for United States President Bill Clinton, who is pitted against his European allies over this issue, Sacirbey said Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic had not been pressured to this move by the United States.

Sacirbey urged that NATO and the U.N. Protection Force play a more active role in Bosnia. He said there were prerogatives for the air strikes on Serb positions in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Mladic Gives UN 2 Weeks To Take 'Positive Steps'

AU2609212294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Sep 94 p 4

[SRNA-attributed report: "Mladic Is Accusing De Lapresle of Crimes Against the Serbian People"]

[Text] Sarajevo—Colonel General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serbian Republic Army General Staff, has accused General Bertrand de Lapresle, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander for Former Yugoslavia, of "crimes against the Serbian people" and has warned him "not to plan any UNPROFOR activities in the Srpska republic until he presents proof of the peace forces' neutrality."

In yesterday's answer to de Lapresle's letter, the commander of the Serbian army's General Staff warned the French general of the "strange and unreasonable decisions involving the needless use of NATO planes, which has for the third time carried out criminal attacks on the Serbian Republic and its population." "I presume that you are aware," reads the letter, "that your decisions and 'actions' have caused numerous casualties among the innocent population and immense material damage."

Gen. Mladic pointed out that the latest NATO and UNPROFOR action on the village of Dobrosevic has destroyed and damaged several private buildings, while the damage to the local school is immense. "General, with this action, you have—without any reason whatsoever—destroyed everything that the people of Dobrosevic created in their lives," writes Gen. Mladic.

According to his words, "the UNPROFOR forces, either accidentally or on purpose, are provoking and inciting incidents against the Srpska republic army with the aim of creating an alibi for the use of aviation or to justify the open support for the Croatian-Muslim forces." "I expect you to understand and take seriously the fact that you have sullied the reputation that you and the UNPROFOR forces enjoyed among the Serbian people when you defiled your hands with the blood of Serbian children whom you killed with NATO planes and UNPROFOR artillery, both used on several occasions on account of the Muslims," reads the letter.

Mladic added that he "could not see much difference between the NATO and UNPROFOR actions and the 1941 events in Kragujevac and Kraljevo that the Serbian people remember." "Because of the latest crime for which you and your forces are responsible, we can no longer assume responsibility for your activity in the Srpska republic," said Gen. Mladic.

He "asked" Gen. de Lapresle not to plan any UNPROFOR activities until he convinces the Serbian side of the absolute neutrality of the "blue helmets" and their peace-oriented mission. "I expect positive steps in the aforementioned direction within the next two weeks," reads Mladic's letter to Gen. de Lapresle.

UNPROFOR: 'Tense Relations' With Serbs Easing

AU2709100994 Paris AFP in English 0942 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 27 (AFP)—Repair teams were inspecting damaged electricity pylons north of Sarajevo Tuesday [27 September] after repairs to power cables west of the city resulted in water flowing in the capital after an almost two-week break, UN officials said.

UN Protection Force spokesman Bernard Labarsouque said a repair team had left for Vogosca, around five kilometres (three miles) north of the city centre, to work on damaged electricity pylons on the front line. The operation was given the green light Monday after the Serbs granted military clearance in line with an accord reached Saturday with the Bosnian government on restoring utilities to Sarajevo. The repairs would start once local commanders were agreed, Lieutenant Colonel Labarsouque said, adding that he did not expect any problems because "it is a line which is useful for everyone." Gas supplies were restored Sunday after an 11-day break.

Labarsouque said UNPROFOR's tense relations with the Serbs had eased slightly since reaching crisis point last Thursday when NATO aircraft destroyed a Serb tank within the Sarajevo 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone. The attack was ordered after the Serbs attacked a French light tank, seriously injuring a soldier.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

However, UNPROFOR and UN humanitarian aid convoys were still blocked by the Serbs, whose threats to aircraft kept Sarajevo airport effectively closed again Tuesday. In private UN officials say the airport could be functional again later this week—possibly Thursday—following the Bosnian Government's policy about-turn Monday, when it asked the United States to delay the lifting of a UN arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR To Begin Repairing Power Pylons

AU2609113894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] We have just received a piece of information from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Electricity Board: According to the UN Protection Force, work will begin today on the reparation of the pylons that bring electricity to the Blazuj transformation station, and to the water spring of Bacevo. The plan is to repair tomorrow the pylon that brings electricity to the Velesici transformation station, which would provide the water pumps with electricity. Repairs of the Reljevo-Buca Potok pylon are supposed to be carried out on Wednesday [28 September].

Sarajevo Remains Without Water, Electricity

AU2709101094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Since natural gas arrived in Sarajevo yesterday, the Velepekara bakery has informed us that [words indistinct] for all residents of Sarajevo today. Electricity and water have still not been restored. As we have learned from the information service of the electric company, work on the transformer station at [word indistinct] is planned for later today. The successful completion of the repair work will enable the water pumps in the town to operate. We have learned from the Sarajevo water authorities that the main Bacevo spring is still not receiving any electricity.

Safety Concerns Prompt UNHCR Aid Decision

AU2609160894 Paris AFP in English 1524 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 26 (AFP)—The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has suspended aid convoys to refugees in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina based in areas under Bosnian Serb control, UNHCR spokesman Yoko Nishimura said Monday [26 September].

Nishimura told AFP the decision was taken after the UNHCR received a letter from the Bosnian Serb authorities saying they could not currently "guarantee the security of convoys" in territories under their control because of the "temporarily unstable situation" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serb authorities had therefore stopped authorising the convoys to cross areas their side held, Nishimura said, adding she had no idea how long it would be before the convoys were able to resume.

On Sunday, General Ratko Mladic, the commander of Bosnian Serb forces, had warned he did not take "any responsibility" for the activities of United Nations personnel in areas under his men's control, and heavily implied that UN forces undertook such activities at their own risk.

Mladic's warning, contained in a letter to UN Protection Force Commander Bertrand de Lapresle, came following an attack by NATO jets on a Bosnian Serb tank near Sarajevo last Friday.

Mladic claimed houses and a school had been hit in the attack, but UN sources are adamant the airstrike did not cause any civilian casualties.

Buha: UN 'Implicitly' Recognizes Srpska Republic

LD2709105594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0954 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Zvornik, Sept 27 (tANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha said that by adopting the resolution against the Bosnian Serb republic the United Nations Security Council had "implicitely recognised it", albeit in a negative way.

In a statement to Bosnian Serb television Monday evening Buha said that if the Bosnian Serb republic was not recognised as an independent state it was difficult "to find formal-legal basis in United Nations documents" to introduce sanctions against it.

The resolution introducing sanctions was adopted last Friday [23 September] in response to the Bosnian Serb rejection to accept the plan proposed by the international contact group on territorial delimitation of the warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Buha said that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not have "any information" about "possible new steps of the Contact Group" but he did not rule out the continuation of the peace process. He added that the Contact Group would have to propose a delimitation of the city of Sarajevo, i.e. the Sarajevo district, according to the position of Pale which has been conveyed to it.

The Contact Group also has to secure "an access to the sea" for the Bosnian Serb republic and to make "constitutional arrangements" for a state made up of the Muslim-Croat federation on one and the Bosnian Serb republic on the other side. It should also draw up a peace plan which should comprise a "document on the lifting of the sanctions" Buha said.

Silajdzic Views 'Unjust' Plan, FRY Sanctions

AU2709101494 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 94 p 7

[Report on interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Mirko Klarin in Brussels; date not given: "We Do Not Want to Die Silently!"]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copright owner(s).

[Text] The news of General Rose's threat to carry out NATO air strikes on Bosnian Government forces because of their actions that the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander assessed as "provoking" the Bosnian Serbs into possibly resuming their shelling of Sarajevo, reached Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Brussels, where he was on a two-day visit. As this threat was given great publicity in the European media, it was logical for us to begin the interview with this issue, that is, Rose's accusations of "provocations." First, Silajdzic called into question the view that it was the Bosnian forces that fired first, and then he said the following:

"If defense is provocation, then we are really forced to be provocative. We are not going to die silently! Another question is: How can a legal army provoke anybody on its own territory, in its own homeland? Gen. Rose is obviously repeating a common mistake made by UN structures, hiding behind some kind of neutrality and completely equating aggressor and victim. This basic mistake is the source of all other mistakes. We are being virtually forbidden from defending ourselves. As things are, Sarajevo has no water, electricity, or natural gas, there is also an ever increasing lack of food, the road under UN control has been cut, while the airlift is being repeatedly canceled... All this should be good enough reason for General Rose to call up the NATO air force for help, but he is not doing that. And in order to avoid doing so, he is invoking the idea of both sides being responsible—which is the best excuse for doing nothing.

"We have seen the United Nations do many things, good and bad, but this, to accuse us of provoking an enemy who besieges us in our own homeland, this is the climax of the culmination, as we say in Bosnia!"

Unexpected Result

In the course of his two-day visit to Brussels, Prime Minister Silajdzic met with European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, as well as with acting NATO Secretary General Sergio Ballanzino. Of the talks in the commission Silajdzic said that they were dedicated to establishing closer contacts with the EU, which was a major trading partner of Bosnia-Herzegovina even before the war. At the meeting in NATO headquarters in Brussels, various scenarios for the engagement of the Western military alliance in the Bosnian crisis were discussed, how and in which directions it will further develop.... In addition, Prime Minister Silajdzic spoke yesterday in the European Parliament's Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security. The greatest part of his speech was dedicated to the method of sanctions applied against Serbia and Montenegro, and also what ought to precede—in the view of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government—their possible easing or lifting.

We continued our interview with the Bosnian prime minister:

[Silajdzic] The result of the latest peace effort by the Contact Group is quite unexpected. Nothing of what they had announced has happened, but instead the sanctions against the Belgrade regime have been eased, on the basis that it has accepted international monitors on the border. In our opinion, this does not solve the basic problem. The basic problem, or rather the cause of everything, is the disregard of the borders on the part of Serbia. The Belgrade regime has still not recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is to say that it has not eliminated the main cause of the problem. We consider that these moves by Belgrade are mere tactics. Only when the Belgrade regime recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will it mean that any real change has taken place.

[Klarin] Do you think that the embargo on the Drina is being effective, and how much time might it take to produce any results, if it remains the only method used?

[Silajdzic] We know that, on the Drina, everything has remained the same: Trucks have been coming and going, oil has been smuggled through, as well as tanks.... How it will be now, with the monitors, we do not know, but neither the embargo nor the monitors are a goal in themselves. The main goal is peace. For that reason we believe that the first step by the Belgrade regime must be the elimination of the causes of this tragedy. And the main cause is the disregard for the borders and the sovereignty of the neighboring countries. As long as greater Serbia is being forged at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, we certainly cannot trust them in anything. Even if the border on the Drina happens to be totally closed, Karadzic's Serbian rebels have far more weapons than everybody else combined.

Policy of Acceptance

[Klarin] While reporting these days on easing the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, some Western journalists have also raised the question how it is to be explained to the citizens of Sarajevo that Milosevic is being rewarded. Is it necessary to explain anything to them?

[Silajdzic] The citizens of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are generally immune to any shocks of that kind. We have had many such shocks. We accepted the Vance-Owen plan, then the Contact Group plan, everything that the international community has proposed. We wanted, despite this horrible tragedy and cataclysm, to remain a member of the international community that observes the basic principles of democracy, freedom of the press, and such things. So far we have been quite successful at this. However, our political opponents, who hold a more radical view of how to resolve the problem, are now asking us: What have you achieved with this policy of acceptance?

[Klarin] Have you pursued that policy of acceptance because of the requirements of the international community, or because you believe that it is an acceptable policy for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

[Silajdzic] The policy follows from another fact. We are pursuing the policy that we consider to be the best for us, as well as for our place in the international community. It has to do with our determination to support democracy and the place that Bosnia-Herzegovina deserves in the international community. I would rather not talk now about the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it is a monument to what Europe wants to be. That may be the reason we are being destroyed. But we shall survive. We have also proved that we want peace by endorsing the federation that is now being built with great strains by Bosniaks and Croats. In my opinion, it is very important that the international community understands this dimension: That it is not only Bosnia that all this is about. Bosnia is a prism that is reflecting the tensions of the present time, and, more importantly, of the future. That is to say, the model for settling the question of Bosnia will be the model for settling the questions of many other Bosnias....

[Klarin] Some time ago such a model was Yugoslavia as well, but it still disintegrated.

[Silajdzic] Yes, but Yugoslavia was composed of six republics that, according to the 1974 Constitution, were sovereign states. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not composed of such republics. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state in which its peoples have constituted themselves, rather than a state constituted by those peoples. This is the main difference. Bosnia-Herzegovina existed even before Yugoslavia, before the EU, before the United Nations, and even before some European states.

Right to Confederation

[Klarin] One of the reasons the Bosnian Serbs use to explain their unwillingness to endorse the peace plan of the Contact Group is the undefined status of the so-called Serbian entity in relation to the federation and the union. How do you see that relationship?

[Silajdzic] As soon as the Serbs decide to join the federation, completely equal relations will be established. The problem is that the current leadership—I am not saying the Serbs—does not want that. A door has been opened to them and we are ready to discuss the establishment of the federation with the other two constituent units, but they cursorily refused. In a private conversation they told us that they had a good laugh when they heard about the proposal.

[Klarin] Many people, not only in Russia and in the West, but also some federation officials who we talked to, consider it quite logical that the Bosnian Serbs have the same right that the Bosnian Croats have been given. Is it acceptable for the federation for the Bosnian Serbs to establish a confederal union with Serbia?

[Silajdzic] Such a union can be discussed. In my opinion, it is undoubtedly true, and even necessary, that the Bosnian Serbs have special relations with Serbia.

[Klarin] Do you mean on the same level that the Bosnian Croats have with Croatia?

[Silajdzic] The level is not the same, that is the point. When speaking about the confederation, we speak about the confederation of Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats on the one side, and Croatia on the other side. In the case of the Serbs, it would be only a confederation of the Serbs with Serbia. Second, Serbia does not recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas Croatia does. Third, Croatia is not an aggressor, while the regime in Belgrade is. Nevertheless, it is normal that the Bosnian Serbs, if they join the federation, can have special relations with Serbia. But we can discuss the issue only when they accept the plan, that is, the proposed maps.

[Klarin] Your acceptance of the plan has been assessed by many to be a tactic. They maintain that you have accepted less because you knew that the Bosnian Serbs would turn the plan down, and that it would eventually fail.

[Silajdzic] Such opinions are known to me. The best test of our acceptance would be if the Bosnian Serbs also accepted the Contact Group's plan. Then everybody could see if our acceptance was a tactic. We are ready to prove this.

Lifting the Embargo

[Klarin] These days in European diplomatic circles stories are being persistently disseminated that the Bosnian Government has changed its mind regarding the necessity of lifting the arms embargo. Is this true?

[Silajdzic] The prime minister of that government is telling you: No, it is not true! We demand that the arms embargo be lifted, because it is unjust and because it deprives us of the elementary right to self-defense, which is the reason for the deaths of tens of thousands of our citizens. But the lifting of the arms embargo is not our goal by itself. Our goal is peace. We demand the lifting of the embargo, which would enable us to achieve peace as soon as possible, rather than to wage war. We are sure that a balance of forces would bring about peace, just as the balance of forces between East and West provided five decades of peace in Europe.

[Klarin] Still, the lifting of the embargo would, according to some assessments, increase the hazard for the blue helmets, and most probably force them to withdraw. In that case, the Western politicians believe, the Bosnian forces would not be able to defend the eastern enclaves and the road that connects Sarajevo and Tuzla with the sea.

[Silajdzic] As for the eastern enclaves, it is those who disarmed them who are responsible for them in the first place! We have to have the means to defend them, or else the international community must intervene in such a way that will bring about peace. Furthermore, this pointing to hazards to which the blue helmets are exposed—what is that supposed to mean? Hazard is an

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

integral part of the military profession, while the embargo imposed on us is a deadly hazard for hundreds of thousands of civilians in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Such arguments about hazards are invoked by those who do not want anything to be done about Bosnia—it is a justification for doing nothing.

[Box, page 7]

[Silajdzic] The maps are certainly unjust. The very proportion of 51 to 49 is unjust. Everything is unjust. But, since we are already discussing the plan, I have to point out that in the region of Prijedor alone, which has been conditionally given to Karadzic's followers, and not the Serbian people, there were three concentration camps: Trnopolje, Keraterm, and Omarska. Three places of horror.

History will remember these as synonyms for horror, just like Auschwitz or Treblinka. We are leaving those places under the control of those who committed such crimes. For the first time in the history of Europe, those who committed such atrocities, and in conditions of global peace rather than of world war, will be given the opportunity to make museums out of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje!

Second, when speaking of Janja, Zvornik, Visegrad and many other places, 70 percent of the population of eastern Bosnia was Bosnian Muslim. If we are to partition the country, what right do they have to those territories? Furthermore, in the course of history, almost all the towns and their infrastructures were built by Bosnian Muslims. Starting with Banja Luka, Zvornik, and Foca. Those towns have been either devastated, or are being given, according to the map, to those who have devastated them, and who have no connection with their building. Therefore, the map is unjust; it is a map that rewards the aggression and genocide. There is no doubt about this. But we have accepted it, invested the entire political credit that we have with the European Parliament, we have succeeded in doing that, but you see what the result is.

[Box, page 7]

[Klarin] These days in the European press and in diplomatic circles there have been many alarming warnings that the federation is being exposed to ever growing tensions, that on both sides there are many people who do not want it to succeed, that nothing is being done finally to constitute it.

[Silajdzic] That there are tensions is completely normal. We are building a new entity, containing two nations that are the victims of the aggression, who have been themselves in conflict, but who are not in conflict any more. One must not underestimate the fact that this conflict is over and thousands of lives have been saved. That is the first and the most important result. We are forming this entity in territory that is not completely under our control.... I would not say that there are many who do not want the Federation. There are groups with different interests, there are extremists, but both the Bosniaks and the Croats want to show good will in the field. There are an awful lot of problems. We are in a state of war, there are shortages of everything, communications are disrupted, and there are many refugees and displaced persons. I think that in history there has never been a case when an entity had to be formed under such circumstances. But I think that we are on our best way to do that, regardless of all the pressures. One more thing: The conflict between the Bosniaks and Croats was no accident; it was a consequence of the aggression, and also a consequence of certain combinations. And these combinations are still active today.

TANJUG Views U.S. Policy on Embargo[TANJUG]

LD2609145194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1323 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Washington, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—Washington has reacted to the suspension of the sanctions against Yugoslavia as an "unavoidable evil" and a diplomatic fiasco, but also as the lesser of two evils.

Had U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madelaine Albright vetoed the suspension in the Security Council last Friday, the "Contact Group" for Bosnia would have disintegrated and U.S.-Russian relations would have deteriorated.

The U.N. Security Council in late May 1992 imposed strict sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia due to its alleged involvement in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Muslim Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic spent last Friday with Secretary of State Warren Christopher trying to persuade him not to relent. That same evening Siljadzic said the United States had "betrayed Bosnia."

President Bill Clinton on Sunday chose to meet with Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic of all the presidents and heads of states currently in New York to attend the 49th session of the U.N. General Assembly. Clinton said the United States had not betrayed the Bosnian Muslims.

Izetbegovic, however, should be aware that Clinton is under pressure from Congress to take radical measures against the Bosnian Serbs, on the one hand, and by Russia and the European countries to reward Belgrade, on the other. Yugoslavia in early August cut all political and economic links with the Bosnian Serbs and shut its borders for all deliveries except for humanitarian aid, after the Bosnian Serb National Assembly failed to accept the Contact Group plan for Bosnia.

Some circles in Washington believe it will soon become evident that Clinton's denial was worse than "betrayal" because he most probably involuntarily told Izetbegovic exactly where he and his cause stand in the U.S. global strategy.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

The Izetbegovic episode in New York was intended as a major link with something far more important for Clinton and the United States—the talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday in Washington. The U.S.-Russian relations are currently at a point without sharp and burning clashes. The sole exception could be the problem of Bosnia.

Yeltsin is prepared to firmly warn the United States about the potential threat of its intention to exempt the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo after October 15. The Islamic countries and the United States demand that the Security Council exempts the Bosnian Muslims from the ban on arms deliveries to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which was imposed on September 1991.

Clinton could now see Izetbegovic as a life-saving solution if he decides to ask "his people" in Congress not to insist on easing the arms embargo until after the coming winter.

Opposing Sides Discuss Exchange of Prisoners

LD2709110194 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] For the first time in this war representatives of all the warring sides met to discuss the problem of missing and imprisoned persons. Ivo Grujic from the Republic of Croatia, Dragan Bulajic representing the [Bosnian] Serb side from Pale, Bosnian Muslim representative Amur Masovic, and Berislav Pusic from Herceg-Bosna met over the past two days in Kupres and in Medjugorje. This is what Berislav Pusic, head of Herceg-Bosna's Commission for Exchange, told us about the results of the meetings:

[Begin recording] [Pusic] The meeting in Medjugorje was attended by representatives of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, the Republic of Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Serbs. Commissions for the exchange of prisoners worked all day on Saturday. This is what was agreed:

A Muslim-Serb exchange was agreed and it will take place at the end of this week. A Serb-Croat exchange was agreed and it should also take place at the end of the week. An agreement between the Muslims and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna was also discussed regarding the four so-called war criminals. Two of them are in prisons on the Muslim side and two on the Croat side. I think this problem will be resolved soon. We also discussed the problem of missing persons. We reached an agreement regarding this. All sides should submit reports [on missing persons] by next Friday when we should meet again.

The Serb and Croat sides took part in the meeting which was held in Kupres yesterday. The Muslim side did not participate. We have a huge problem regarding missing soldiers on both sides. The remains of some soldiers and civilians were exchanged a long time ago and we have problems identifying them. We agreed to submit complete reports regarding this problem by Friday when we should also agree on the next exchange of remains.

[Unidentified correspondent] Did you discuss the problem of the 26 missing Croats from Bugojno with the Bosniak side?

[Pusic] The Bosniak side discussed this with us but I have to point out that we have 18 unsolved cases in Mostar, 23 in Grabovica, 26 in Trusina, and 35 missing persons in Bikose near Travnik. We know that all the people mentioned are dead except in the case of Bugojno where we have received certain reports. We agreed to meet again next week and to compile reports on all cases I mentioned so that bodies can be exchanged. [end recording]

Croat, Muslim 'Terrorists' Clash Near Tuzla

LD2609210094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2047 GMT 26 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sep 26 (TANJUG)—Croat and Muslim terrorists of the Muslim armed forces clashed near Tuzla in northeastern Bosnia Monday, Bosnian Serb military sources said.

A statement carried by the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency said there were casualties on both sides. According to unofficial reports, the Muslims neutralized the Croat terrorists, SRNA said.

After a year of heavy armed clashes, Muslims and Croats signed an agreement to form a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under United States pressure in Washington in March this year. Under the agreement, the federation would later form a confederation with Croatia.

Both Muslim and Croat sources confirm that things are running far from smoothly in the new federation. There have been reports of clashes, increasingly frequently armed ones, between the allies in the war against Bosnian Serbs.

Agreement Reached To Clear All Mostar Barricades

AU2609201494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Report by Zlata Behan]

[Text] Representatives of the eastern and western parts of Mostar today signed an agreement on freedom of movement in the city. Zlata Behan reports.

[Behan] The Croatian side has not been cooperative until now; however, under pressure from EU Administrator Hans Koschnik, an agreement was signed according to which from 5 October onward, Mostar will be a city of

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

clean streets, without barricades and checkpoints. Prompted by this, your correspondent spoke to Mayor Safet Orucevic. This is what he told me.

Today was a very significant day for Mostar. The removal of all obstacles in the city by 5 October was agreed, and I believe this will help all communications function once more. Mostar will finally no longer be a partitioned city, said Mayor Orucevic. He added: We signed this after long talks with the help of the UN Protection Force and the EU; both sides have the task of clearing away all barricades in the city. The next point on the agenda concerned the opening of the Aviators Bridge for traffic and free passage. The Croatian side contested this, but following a long discussion, we agreed to hold another meeting tomorrow at 1000 [0900 GMT] in the Pensioners Home, after which we will sign the agreement. Of course, we are going to hold consultations in the meantime and ask the Army for approval. There are no barricades in the Mostar demilitarized zone. The 4th Corps command has handed over all authority to the civilian bodies as was agreed in an agreement signed in Brussels and Geneva. I believe that the Croatian side does not have this authorization and will have to consult with the Croatian Defense Council.

The second question was as follows: You said that the issue of Mostar should be solved in Zagreb, Geneva, and Vienna. To what extent did these statements—made before the latest consultations in Zagreb—influence the negotiations in Mostar today? Mayor Orucevic answered: Well, yes. It was evident from the Croatian negotiators' stance that they received instructions from Zagreb, just as we expected. The negotiations at the highest level resulted in an agreement that the public is familiar with. Certain steps are being taken in this direction, and today's meeting and agreement are certainly the result of a comprehensive political influence on all bodies of authority in western Mostar regarding the fact that Mostar must be reunited, that all barricades must be removed, that the people must be able to reclaim their property, and the signed agreement implemented in this way. From 5 October on, Mostar will be without barricades and the Aviators Bridge will be open to civilian traffic. The issue of the Aviators Bridge will be solved tomorrow, however, as far as the remaining barricades are concerned, and Mostar will be completely clear and free for all communications after 5 October.

These were the final words of Mayor Safet Orucevic, while my final words were: May we live to see this happen!

Presidency Member on Obstacles Facing Federation

LD2409170094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Sep 94

[Text] Ivo Komsic, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and chairman of the Croat National Council, spoke about the problems of setting up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a roundtable discussion organized today by the Council of the Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals. [Name indistinct] has this report:

[Correspondent] What is the essence of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? This a question to which Ivo Komsic tried to give a reply at a roundtable discussion today under a very interesting title—Some Elements and Observations Important for the Functioning of the Federation. Komsic recalled the aims of signing the Washington Agreement [words indistinct] war between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council, the establishment of bases for the new set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and removal of fears that have blocked political life and escalated conflicts.

On the basis of the Washington Agreement a Constitution was drawn up, according to which the federation is defined as a complex state made up of cantons, which are made up of municipalities. As regards what this organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina is aimed at achieving, Ivo Komsic said:

[Begin Komsic recording] This model was proposed to disperse fears that existed that the state would become, as it was frequently called, a unitary state. The government has been completely decentralized and localized, while on the other hand, the cantonal organization has been set up to prevent the danger, or the big danger I would say, of any of the cantons seceding from the federation. This federal model refers to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders. A possibility has been left for negotiations with Karadzic's Serbs to be wound up in such a way that the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a constitutive, state-building nation for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that this nation with its regions, i.e. cantons, join the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an equal basis. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Komsic's general assessment is that the setting up of the federation—which is the key for the resolution of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and forming relations with the aggressor—has not proceeded within the appropriate timescale, primarily in (?central spheres):

[Begin Komsic recording] We all know that the federal institutions have already been set up. As regards the implementation of the federation, it has been carried out only at that top level. However, the federation cannot exist without the other two levels of authority—the cantonal and municipal levels [five-second break in transmission]. The setting up of the federation was halted while the process of municipal and cantonal authorities was being constituted. Except for the Tuzla Canton, which has been constituted and municipalities within it reconstituted, we do not have anything else; these processes have not even started elsewhere. [end recording]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

[Correspondent] Komsic gives two reasons that have slowed down the process of setting up the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation—the para-state creation of Herceg-Bosna and the republican system that is filled primarily by Bosniak representatives who make up 90 percent of cadres in the government structures and diplomatic missions.

What represents a dilemma for Ivo Komsic is the issue of whether the slowing down of the process of implementing the federation comes as a result of a political [break in transmission] or a political strategy aiming at achieving in a peaceful way what was not achieved by war. If this proves to be a political strategy, then we will have to fight again for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally-recognized borders, Ivo Komsic concluded.

Ambassador to Croatia Views Federation

AU2609124394 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Sep 94 p 6

[Interview with Dr. Kasim Trnka, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Croatia, by Ahmed Buric; place and date not given: "The Federation Is Not a Division"]

[Text] [Buric] Mr. Trnka, one of the most topical issues lately has been the defeat of Abdic's para-state. As ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you visited Velika Kladusa immediately before Abdic's fall. We believe our readers will be interested in what was happening during these moments, which may be called historical, and how do you think the political situation in Cazinska Krajina is going to develop?

Abdic's Manipulations

[Trnka] The public is aware of the fact that, as ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I visited Velika Kladusa just before it was liberated, my main intention being to try to persuade Fikret Abdic not to move the people from their homes, because it would be nonsense. At the time, he was facing military defeat and the breakdown of his autonomy. Unfortunately, he did not agree to give up his unconstitutional creation, nor was he prepared to subordinate to the command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, although he was publicly stating that he accepted the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation Constitution. The demands I have mentioned were in fact just a logical consequence of one of his public statements. Naturally, he also did not agree to a joint declaration being issued in which the people would be urged to stay in their homes, because I saw with my own eyes that neither the houses nor the production facilities have been destroyed in Velika Kladusa, and there are realistic conditions for these people to live there, and, moreover, to stand there as a powerful dam against the Serb expansion and an important element of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since this did not happen, his plan was obviously to take all these people hostage in case he is militarily defeated, so he told them that the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army would massacre them, or that the Serbs would shell Velika Kladusa. Under this pressure, the people started leaving, for the Serb-controlled territory in the Republic of Croatia.

This is where Abdic showed who it was he was cooperating with. He cooperated with the forces that killed so many Muslim Bosniaks, that carried out the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and supported Abdic all this time just because he was breaking the Muslim corps and working directly against Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what I told him directly, during the conversation we had on 20 August in Velika Kladusa.

[Buric] According to your information, what happened to the refugees from Velika Kladusa? It seems that a great number of people left the area.

[Trnka] Abdic continued to manipulate these people by bringing them into the UNPA [UN Protected Area], and he is now holding them on the Serb territory, which perfectly suits the Serbs. With his people, the soldiers who fled along with him, he controls everything and renders impossible any contact aimed at conveying true information to these refugees, and he will not even allow the international organizations to establish information centers there and inform people what the real situation in Velika Kladusa is.

I would like to point out that the international organizations have stated that not only is the situation in Kladusa peaceful and stable, and that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has withdrawn from the town and is protecting the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also that the people of the 5th Corps have completed the job in a fully professional manner, that they caused no civil casualties, and that there has been no violation of the international war and humanitarian rights. Therefore, by keeping these refugees, he is manipulating their suffering and trying to achieve some of these political aims, which he has now clearly lost any possibility of realizing. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Government of the Republic of Croatia have cooperated well in this job. The only difficult issue is the humanitarian aid. We have increased the aid, with the aim of explaining that the people who are some 20 km from their homes have no reason to be refugees, but that they should instead return home. Abdic was giving them great promises that by going to Germany or some other countries they would be given 1,000 German marks' welfare, apartments to live in, and so on, and this is how he "occupied" them. I think that at this moment the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing all the guarantees for the return of the refugees, extending the amnesty, and even allowing that a refugee center be established in Velika Kladusa, with the possibility of asylum for anyone who does not wish to join the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has done everything possible.

Personally, I am sorry that these people down there are exposed to suffering in this situation, and that contagious diseases have appeared. I still believe that the only

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

solution is for these people to return to their homes, because they will never be as welcome anywhere else, and, ultimately, it will not be their home.

[Buric] You took over your duties in the Embassy in Zagreb at the time when the emergence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was in focus. Information from the ground says that in some places and some segments the establishment of the Federation is still at a standstill.

[Trnka] We should go back to the beginning, to the concluding of the Washington Agreement and the passing of the Federation Constitution, which were not conceived as an everyday political move, to stop the war that very instant—although that is, naturally, very important—but as the first step in the serious peace process on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I would even say the former Yugoslavia. In fact, the Federation project was conceived as the first stage, in which it will first be the Federation of the cantons of Bosniaks and Croats, so that in the further stage there can be Federation over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The project has certainly yielded some notable results, but there has been some stagnation, for several reasons. Certain pragmatic reasons could be sought in the profiteer consciousness and the interests of the local power-wielders, who see loss of their material positions in the establishment of the legal system and the normal flow of goods and capital. This is an inevitable side-effect, but it seems to me that another issue is more important, and I believe it should be dealt with as soon as possible. The issue is whether all the agents of the Washington Agreement retain the present Federation concept and the concept of the agreement. Is the thesis on preserving the integrity and inviolability of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina truly acceptable to all, or does someone think that through the Federation they could actualize their visions of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Serbs and the Croats?

The Prospects in Togetherness

We have assessed that resistance also stems from this conceptual disagreement on the prospects of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it is surprising that the dilemma should arise now—it could have been posed before the agreement was signed. If the dilemma existed, then they should not have signed an act that prospectively, objectively, means not only preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as an entity, but also the development of good-neighborly relations with the Republic of Croatia, including the development of confederate relations. I think this is a good moment to point this out.

You cannot draw any automatic parallel between the confederation with Croatia and the possible confederation with Serbia, firstly because the Republic of Croatia has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an international and legal entity, and as a state, and because the Republic of Croatia was not an aggressor against Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense in which Serbia and Montenegro have been. Serbia and Montenegro have not recognized us within the existing borders, nor do they want to discuss the resolving of the ethnic issue of the Bosniaks in Serbia or the resolving of the ethnic issue of any of the non-Serbs, for that matter. The aggression and the ethnic cleansing continue. They are insisting on creating an ethnically pure territory in the areas in which a mixed population traditionally lives. This should be cleared in the peace processes, and it should be to the benefit of the Federation to destroy a fascist ideology of the Serb leadership that conceptually aims at creating ethnically pure territories, which is nothing but genocide.

[Buric] What should be insisted on in establishing the Federation and in the life in it?

[Trnka] We must simply state what it is that each of us wants of the Federation until we accomplish what the international community has supported, especially through the United States, which is that through the Federation democratic relations be established in which both the multi-party political system and the different political opinions and views on political issues will emerge, as well as a multiethnic and multiconfessional outlook in the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Personally, I was primarily working on creating the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and, within my abilities, on the creation of the Washington Agreement. I took the agreement as the victory of the concept of life together in relation to ethnic division and ethnic exclusiveness. We should not forget that the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which supported three republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was nothing but the creation of ethnic states of which ethnic cleansing would be the logical continuation, and through which genocide would be legalized. The establishment of the Federation has shown that this concept would not have been good, and that the people who have traditionally lived together for centuries, can continue to live together, under the condition that the fascist ideology supporting ethnically cleansed territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina be defeated.

[Buric] There has been much talk of the Zagreb Embassy lately. What is the situation now, considering that the talk concerned reducing the staff?

[Trnka] We should bear in mind that Bosnia-Herzegovina was building its diplomacy in objectively the most difficult conditions, and that the diplomacy had to take on a huge part of the obligations and responsibility, I would say, thanks to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. While our young men were dying in the trenches, this young, inexperienced diplomacy, with insufficient professional staff, with certain weaknesses, had to fight the battle for the recognition of the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, there were weaknesses and mistakes there, and the selection criteria were often not the best. The Zagreb Embassy, by the nature of its primarily geographic position, had to take over most of the work, not only because of the number of the refugees, but also because Zagreb is the first transit

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

station toward Europe and the rest of the world. It should also be added that the political solutions for Croatia and Bosnia are connected, and these problems had to be dealt with in a serious way. It was not easy, and with all these experiences it was necessary to mend the mistakes along the way. There is a reorganization process under way, and I believe it will deal with the current deficiencies.

[Box, p 6]

Referendum as a Smokescreen

The ideology that tried to drag the Serb people into the massacre of everything that is not part of the Orthodox and Serb-ness.

The key issue is that they produce genocide systematically, and I especially insist that the individual bearers of this genocidal ideology be identified, and that theyanswer before the International Court. Responsibility cannot be global, and you cannot have an entire people responsible for something, which is precisely what the Serb ideologists would like to do: To transfer the responsibility on the entire people, as can be seen from this so-called referendum. No one in their right mind would think of holding an allegedly democratic referendum in conditions of war, under the pressure of weapons. The point is that the Serb leaders wanted to use the results of the referendum to formally cover their responsibility. Now they want to make it seem that it is up to the entire people, and not those who led them into this. The international institutions should be told that there is individual responsibility for this genocide project, and that it is the result of an ideology for which individuals are responsible, and not the willingness of an entire people, and this should be insisted on.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Tudjman, Clinton Discuss Reintegration Process

LD2609190194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Croatian and U.S. Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Bill Clinton held talks for more than 50 minutes at UN headquarters. Tihomir Vinkovic reports from New York.

[Vinkovic] The talks have been described as a great step forward in Croatian-American relations. Croatia has received firm guarantees that the UNPA [UN Protected Area] and Pink Zones will be reintegrated in the legal and political system of Croatia. Among other things, the two Presidents discussed the crisis in Bosnia- Herzegovina, as well as bilateral Croatian-American relations.

In addition to President Tudjman, the Croatian side included ministers Granic and Defense Minister Susak, Petar Sarcevic, Croatian ambassador to the United States, Croatia's permanent UN representative Mario Nobilo, and advisors Matic and Jaksic.

In addition to President Clinton, the American side included Secretary of State Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, Charles Thomas, the U.S. President's special envoy at the negotiations on former Yugoslavia, and State Department official [name indistinct].

As I am reporting this, a working lunch organized by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali is under way for all the participants in the 49th UN General Assembly session.

Tudjman 'Absolutely Satisfied'

LD2609221994 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2045 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Interview with President Franjo Tudjman by unidentified correspondent in New York; interview interrupts Croatian television program entitled "Croatia and the World," panel debate on UNPROFOR's mandate and role in Croatia—live]

[Text] [Correspondent] What is your comment on your talks with President Clinton?

[Tudjman] Understandably, my talks with President Clinton and the entire U.S. delegation were very constructive. I could say, very friendly talks. We can be absolutely satisfied with them. President Clinton and the U.S. delegation have a great deal of understanding for Croatia's justified demands regarding the integration of the occupied territories in Croatia's legal and constitutional system. They are just advising us to be considerate in our immediate demands in light of the overall resolution of the problems surrounding Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to contribute on our part to further progress in the search for a peaceful solution.

On my part, I pointed out that we are going to continue following this path in the framework of global relations within which we have not only won recognition, but have also become a respectable factor in the creation of a new world order. Likewise, we must also defend our national and state interests, and we can no longer tolerate delays in resolving the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas]. In this context we met with understanding and we can expect results from these relations.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, you also talked about the bilateral relations between Croatia and the United States.

[Tudjman] Yes, we did. Both sides, both delegations, President Clinton and our delegation, agreed that there has been progress in the bilteral relations in every sphere, in a very positive way, across a wide range, that they are becoming increasingly wide- ranging, and that both sides will persist in this direction.

[Correspondent] What do you expect from tomorrow's talks at the UN Security Council?

[Tudjman] Let us wait and see what happens tomorrow. I expect, first of all, I am going to voice our demands, which are well-known, following the spirit of our parliament's resolution. Then, we are going to talk about what the UN Security Council can adopt at the moment within the context of the resolutions it has passed so far. We are also going to point out what we cannot give up.

[Correspondent] Does the fact that the talks were also attended by Defense Minister Gojko Susak mean that certain cooperation is possible in the future between Croatia and the United States in this sphere?

[Tudjman] As you have raised this question you probably know, as our public does, that U.S. Defense Secretary Perry has visited Croatia, Zagreb, and that even then he said that there is cooperation and a readiness for further cooperation. Apart from this, Mr. Susak has already left for Washington for further talks. Hence, it is in the interest of both the United States and Croatia in particular to cooperate in this area.

Economic Cooperation Pact With Sarajevo Signed

LD2609133994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1303 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] An agreement on economic cooperation was signed today between the Sarajevo area and the Croatian Chamber of Commerce headquarters in Zagreb. The purpose of the agreement is to improve economic cooperation between Zagreb and Sarajevo business people at all levels.

Karlovac Refugees Protest Muslims Taking Homes

LD2609154394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1303 GMT 26 Sep 94

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

[Text] The association of refugees from the Karlovac area has sent a note of protest to the UN forces in Sector North, protesting against the Muslim refugees from Velika Kladusa moving into the abandoned homes of Croats in Turanj, Nisici, and other areas within the Blue Zone.

Another note of protest was sent to the Croatian Government, the Defense Ministry, and Interior Ministry by the local committee of Bilaj and Barlete following the setting up of a UN checkpoint at Medovaca near Bilaj. The committee has asked for the checkpoint to be dismantled by 27 of this month at noon.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Albania's Zhulali Notes Prospects for Partnership

AU2609130594 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 26 Sep 94

[Text] Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali arrived on a two-day official visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] yesterday. He was welcomed in Debar by the Macedonian Deputy Defense Minister Nazmi Malichi, and the Albanian Ambassador to Macedonia, Shaban Murati. In his statement for the press, Zhulali said the visit is a part of the overall good mutual relations, adding Macedonia is a highly respected country and a peace factor in the region. His recent visit to Brussels, he said, is also related to this visit, "as now, after the Cold War, there are some new winds," having all eastern European countries either already in or intending to be included in NATO. The Albanian minister expressed belief Macedonia will soon become a Partnership for Peace member.

During his stay in Debar, Zhulali met with local PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] branch officials, and today will be received by Macedonian Minister of Defense Vlado Popovski. He will also meet and talk with President Gligorov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski.

Four Candidates To Contest Presidential Election

AU2609133494 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 26 Sep 94

[Excerpt] The deadline for submitting lists of parliamentary and presidential candidates expired at midnight last night. Four presidential nominees will run in the elections—Kiro Gligorov, candidate of the Alliance for Macedonia (proposed by 47 MP's [members of parliament] signatures); Ljubisa Georgievski, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] candidate (nominated by 37 MP's); Halit Shaban of the Democratic Party of Turks (proposed by 10,000 citizens' signatures); and Gjorgi Atanasovski, who also succeeded in gathering the required 10,000 citizens' signatures. The State Election Commission is to discuss the submitted nominations at its today's session to determine whether the candidates meet all requirements stated in Article 80 of the Constitution. [passage omitted]

PDP Campaign Supports 'Multiethnic' Concept

AU2609133594 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Sep 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "The Albanians—A Constitutive People"]

[Text] In the next four years the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] will make efforts to provide Albanians with the constitutional status of a nation. This was confirmed at the Central Assembly of the party held two days ago, when Party President and Secretary Abdurahman Aliti and Naser Ziberi talked about the experiences of the party so far and future tasks, as well as about the election platform under the slogan "A Common Road to the Future."

To judge from the election platform, the PDP is making efforts to have Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] a multiethnic state in which consensus democracy will be applied on the vital issues and in which the Albanian language will be official.

With that goal, the PDP will try to change the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. In that way they hope to remedy the dissatisfaction with the Constitution that declares Macedonia the national state of the Macedonian people only, dissatisfaction that has resulted into the option of political and territorial autonomy for Albanians in the state.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Party Leader Explains Motives for New Coalition

AU2309072794 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Janez Jansa, leader of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, by Davor Gjenero; place and date not given: "The Worshippers of Profit Have Been Pushing Us Into Crime"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text]*Janez Jansa is one of the central figures of contemporary Slovene politics. Even those who "cannot bear the sight of him" will admit this. This still young politician has not earned this position only by the merits of defending Slovenia before the Serbian aggression as successful defense minister; he has been in the center of the political public's attention at least since spring 1988, when he was arrested by the "Yugoslav" Counterintelligence Service and the Slovene Security Service together with Borstner, Tasic, and Zavrla, and tried for "disclosing a military secret." The trial of "the four", among whom Jansa was undoubtedly the central figure, was the beginning of the "Slovene Spring." The Slovene opposition intelligentsia saw the trial of the four as a serious attack on the national being, and the protests before the military court in Ljubljana marked the beginning of the Slovene national energy being united, which, in less than two years, destroyed the monolithic political system and led Slovenia to independence.*

Jansa is at present again at the center of another gathering. While Slovenia is ruled by the coalition of liberals, Christian Democrats, and former communists, Jansa has been forming a "coalition of the new Slovene Spring" for the forthcoming local elections, which is supposed to consist of his Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, the Slovene People's Party, and the Slovene Christian Democrats, who are still in "Drnovsek's" ruling coalition.

The Culprits Have Been Making Accusations!

[Gjenero] Is the emerging coalition a coalition of right-wing parties and the center right and an expression of the continuation of the bipolar structure of the Slovene political scene, which has been a kind of constant since before World War II, when Slovene politics was marked by the division between Catholic and liberal groups?

[Jansa] Bipolarity became a tragic fact in 1945, when the winning side in the socialist revolution and civil war physically disposed of the political opposition and declared itself the political avant garde. From 1945 to 1990 we had extreme bipolarity: on the one hand there was the avant-garde communist party, while on the other there was everybody else; members of the only party permitted with the nomenclature on the one side and non-members on the other. Bipolarity is thus a fact that has existed primarily since 1945, and the period preceding it can only be discussed in a relative way.

[Gjenero] It is precisely those who caused the bipolarity who are now reproaching others for causing it.

[Jansa] It is true that those who caused the bipolarity still have the prevailing power in the economy, finances, and the bodies of authority in Slovenia. Now they twist the facts, and present things as if it were someone else who wants to cause bipolarity.

However, bipolarity is a fact. Since 1990 there have been processes under way that have aimed to dispose of or mitigate this bipolarity. These democratic processes are headed by the political parties that emerged during the "Slovene Spring," and not the successors of the former social and political organizations.

The name that you have used for the coalition that we have been trying to organize is not appropriate, either. It is neither a rightist coalition nor a coalition of the center right, as the parties participating in the negotiations on this coalition are those that emerged during the time of the "Slovene Spring," and if we use European terminology, we can say that the parties participating in this coalition are all parties covering the political spectrum from left to right.

[Gjenero] An outside observer of the Slovene political scene must notice the many political scandals. One of them is the scandal in which you were supposedly involved, after which you departed as defense minister. Fighting against corruption is one of the aims of the coalition that you are forming, but the fact that there have been so many scandals certainly must imply something else.

[Jansa] This is partly a consequence of the past times. The channels, lodges, and groups that were formed during the one-party system still function. This is one reason and another lies in the neo-communist-liberal ideology that now prevails in the greatest part of the ruling coalition, and that declares profit to be its main motto; this is pragmatism whose aim is to create as much profit as possible, since—they say—it is the only thing that matters.

If in a society that has just started to establish its legal infrastructure and in which moral principles are greatly reduced, the profit principle is established as the center of the value system, this philosophy necessarily encourages large-scale crime, which sooner or later comes to light and appears everywhere.

Those who are guilty of this large-scale crime blame it on those who disclose the criminal activity, reporters or opposition politicians, claiming that they are causing scandals.

There is an attempt to twist the facts completely, but Slovenia has, thanks primarily to the modern Constitution adopted in 1991, managed to preserve a certain degree of formal democracy, despite all these events, but underneath the carpet there are more and more unresolved problems, which have a strong influence on public opinion and is forcing people to become reoriented.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

The Twelve Illegitimate Ones

[Gjenero] Although at the elections you were elected a parliamentary deputy, at present you are not carrying out these duties, since, having left the ministry, you have not taken up your seat. Nevertheless, what is your assessment of Slovene parliamentary life at present?

[Jansa] A characteristic aspect of our parliament is that at least 12 deputies there are illegitimate, as they were elected on the basis of programs that are different from those that they represent now.

They are several deputies from Jelincic's National Party, who appeared at the elections with a radical national program, and then gave the votes that they won to Drnovsek by confirming him as prime minister designate. This group thus completely twisted their program. It then dissolved but Jelincic still has several seats.

There are also the Democrats, who appeared at the elections with a slogan that they would never support any connection between the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democratic Party; they emphasized that the difference between them was obvious, and after that they entered precisely this Liberal Democratic Party that they most opposed! They thus betrayed their voters, because if the voters had wanted to vote for the Liberal Democrats, they would have done so at the elections!

Moreover, there are five deputies who were elected for the "Green Ticket," and now they have entered the party representing the program that is the most strongly opposed to the greens; the Liberal one.

From the point of view of democracy, if only a formal democracy, all these deputies have completely lost their legitimacy. However, Slovenia does not have the legislation that would punish such transfers in an appropriate way. These 12 deputies make decisions concerning the majority or the minority, and not only an absolute majority, but—as our parliament is small, having only 90 deputies—almost a two-thirds majority. Those who claim that the entire parliament is illegitimate are not right, but those 12 deputies certainly have no political legitimacy. This is the key characteristic of this parliamentary life, which influences everything else.

[Gjenero] Slovene politics was once marked by a coalition—Demos, which emerged before the first parliamentary elections, and disintegrated when one of the main aims of the coalition [Slovene independence] was achieved. Will the coalition that is emerging now last longer?

[Jansa] We are trying to connect all the parties of the "Slovene Spring" into this coalition. As opposed to the time of Demos, now there is much more time for sober consideration.

There is not such a hurry as there was then, as there is no more Yugoslavia, and one of the two key aims of the Demos coalition—the Slovene state becoming independent—has been achieved. At the time, Demos did quite a good job of it.

Our ambition is now to create a coalition that will last more than only two years. However, we are aware of the realistic fact that some of the parties in this coalition are in opposition, and one of the parties of the "Slovene Spring" is in the government coalition, so this coalition of ours is impossible to build overnight.

We therefore intend to do this job in several stages. The first stage involves a joint appearance at the local elections. After that, if we succeed, we will continue negotiations for the subsequent parliamentary elections.

Resolution Before the Elections

[Gjenero] People reproached Dr. Joze Pucnik, your predecessor as leader of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, who was also the "boss" of Demos, for neglecting to shape the identity of his own party while building the identity of Demos. Is your party again in such a danger—it was relatively small after the 1992 elections, and now it is the second most influential on the Slovene political scene?

[Jansa] It is probably not in such danger. Times are different. The former joint demands of the Demos coalition have already been met and now there are no demands on individual parties to renounce their identity. The most important thing in this coalition is that the points that are common become part of the joint program and that we implement them together.

With this agreement that we are preparing and the proposal that is contained in it, no party renounces its political program, so this danger does not exist. Moreover, in the five or six years that we have had free party life in Slovenia, the parties have become so well profiled that their programs are more clearly recognizable than in the time of Demos, when people could not tell which party was which; the only thing they knew was which parties were old and which were new.

[Gjenero] How long do you think the ruling coalition can remain in power, and when do you think the next parliamentary elections could take place in Slovenia?

[Jansa] Our party did not demand from the Christian Democrats that they leave the government coalition for a joint appearance at the local elections. However, we expect that at the next parliamentary elections they will make their appearance with the parties that will appear together at the local elections—naturally assuming that the appearance is successful, as a certain degree of pragmatism is necessary.

We have not made any demands that are impossible to meet, as I think that the Christian Democrats, who are at present in the coalition, after some parties joined to form a great liberal democracy, are there primarily to reassure people that the parties in this coalition are not only

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

parties from the former socialist self-management system. Given time, this is going to become very conspicuous, and not even the leadership of the Slovene Christian Democrats will be able to hide it. This is why I expect that certain things will be resolved before the regular parliamentary elections.

Supporting an Alliance With Croatia

[Gjenero] The central problems in relations between Croatia and Slovenia concern the borders and economic relations that the former Yugoslavia left behind. What is your assessment of relations between the two countries?

[Jansa] The fact is that it must be in the interest of both states that the problems that still exist be resolved as soon as possible. Perhaps many things should have been resolved earlier, but none of the problems—either in the field of economics or those concerning the border issue—is such that it could cause great conflicts in the sober judgment of the wise authorities in both states. I do not see these open issues as tragic.

I believe that Slovenia should worry much more about the signals arriving from Italy, and I think that Croatia should pay much more attention to them, too. They are at present aimed primarily against Slovenia, but they relate to a problem that is greater for Croatia than Slovenia. I suppose that in the following years our three neighboring states will form a triangle of some kind, and an alliance between the two smaller countries in this triangle would not be redundant.

[Gjenero] Prime Minister Drnovsek once reproached Peterle's government, in which you were defense minister, that during the time Slovenia was becoming independent it did too little to resolve the problems with Croatia.

[Jansa] At that time Mr. Drnovsek was still some kind of associate member of the Yugoslav Presidency, so he had a role in it too, or may have. At that time he was meeting with Croatian politicians too, and the truth is that, in that atmosphere of joint interests in leaving Yugoslavia, there were certain things that could have been elaborated on more precisely than was the case.

This is what I had in mind when I said that the best time for resolving the problems between our two countries may already have passed. The Slovene Government should have forced the resolving of these problems more at the time.

It is understandable that Croatia had more problems at the time, and that it did not force the resolving of the problems with Slovenia. At that time it should have been a priority for Slovenia, but obviously this was not the case.

The Weakening of the Army

[Gjenero] What is your assessment of security and the level of Slovenia's defense?

[Jansa] I must say that I have been rather worried lately, especially because of the political purges that have decapitated a great part of the Slovene Army over the past two months.

Many important positions in the Slovene Army have been taken by incompetent people who are not capable of heading the units with which they have been entrusted, which is worrying, especially because—and this also worries me—there are radical signals coming from pro-fascist and other forces in Italy, regarding the Ossimo Accords and other agreements.

We were recently faced with our citizens being recruited for Italian citizenship, which are signals that should make a political analyst very much concerned.

At such a time it is particularly irresponsible to weaken one's own defenses.

[Gjenero] Your successor at the Defense Ministry, Jelko Kacin, recently said in an interview for a Croatian newspaper that there had been indications that you and a group of your people were preparing a coup. Is this the explanation for the changes in the Slovene Army?

[Jansa] This may be one of the excuses, but the commissions that my successor himself appointed have found nothing to support this, at least not in the official reports. Moreover, it is ridiculous to discuss such things, since, if this had really happened, they would probably not have replaced me, because they would not have been able to do so!

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Federal

Stoltenberg, Owen To See Milosevic, Hear Report

LD2609193694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, co-chairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, arrived in Belgrade this evening. Stoltenberg and Owen are expected to be received by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic tomorrow.

According to the secretariat of the conference on former Yugoslavia in Geneva, Stoltenberg and Lord Owen will also meet Bo Pelnas, the coordinator of the UN humanitarian mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Pelnas is expected to submit a report on the mission's work to the co-chairmen, and Thorvald Stoltenberg will immediately forward it to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali.

Meet Border Observer Chief

AU2709122294 Paris AFP in English 1134 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, Sept 27 (AFP)—International negotiators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg met Tuesday [27 September] with the Swedish general sent here to report on Serbia's blockade of Bosnian Serbs, ahead of midday talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, aides said.

They said the talks with the retired Swedish general, Po Pellnas, at the Intercontinental Hotel were still underway after an hour. [passage omitted]

Deployment of the international observer mission is still only half complete however. Out of 135 people, mainly from the Nordic countries, due to be deployed, only 85 have arrived so far.

The independent Yugoslav news agency BETA said the remainder would be arriving in the next few days.

To Inspect Border

AU2709131894 Paris AFP in English 1257 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, Sept 27 (AFP)—International negotiators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg said they would go to the border with Bosnia Tuesday [27 September] to see for themselves how rump Yugoslavia was enforcing its blockade against Bosnia.

The two spoke after meeting with the retired Swedish general Bo Pellnas, who heads an international observer mission monitoring the border. They immediately went on to meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

They gave no details on what they had been told by Pellnas, whose findings could determine whether UN-imposed sanctions crippling rump Yugoslavia for more than two years will be eased, saying only they had come "to investigate."

"We have had a presentation by the headquarters staff and we are going to see for ouselves later this afternoon," Owen said after an hour-and-a-half meeting with the Swedish general.

Owen said that after he and Stoltenberg had visited the border and met again "in consultation" with Pellnas, they would submit a report on the results of their mission to their respective authorities—the European Union leadership for Owen and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali for Stoltenberg. [passage omitted]

Sainovic on Conditions for Economic Stability

AU2609214294 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic by Dusko Petrovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Sainovic] For our economic recovery and development, we need peace and economic stability. Our peace policy, which was confirmed by the gesture on the part of the Security Council, ensures the former condition and the implementation of our program ensures the latter. Therefore, this is a favorable convergence of the success of the program and the success of our policy of peace in the Balkans, which is giving a completely new force to the further course of the program implementation, because all our partners throughout the world and all businessmen in our country are receiving more encouragement than before to start extremely serious preparations for intensifying our economic cooperation with the world, something that is not only going to broaden our market opportunities and create conditions for our industrial production to grow more quickly, but also to bring about something that I consider particularly important—legal economic relations with the world; there will be less smuggling and gray economy, and conditions will be created for more stable economic planning for the future.

[Petrovic] An impression is being created that some forces in our country that have been defeated on the peace plan do not now favor these stable economic conditions in Yugoslavia either. Can one speak about an organized political campaign against the (?program) on the part of some forces?

[Sainovic] Well, I think that our public knows very well that, as you put it, there are both groups and forces who have been against the program from the moment it was introduced. Some are against the program out of their petty politicking reasons and others out of reasons of speculative, in fact, some great financial interests. The stability of the program so far has been a great guarantee to all of us that the program can be implemented in this way, and it has, at the same time, been a great obligation to protect economic stability from backstabbing on the part of those people who want to undermine this stability.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

[Petrovic] Some trends that are somewhat upsetting are taking place in the sphere of prices, as well as of the dinar exchange rate. There is pressure on prices and the exchange rate. What is your comment?

[Sainovic] There is no reason at all for prices to increase. So far, government interventions—above all by the Government of the Republic of Serbia—have been successful, and I am sure they will continue to be so. One intervenes by influencing the harmful monopoly of some producers and by importing some goods, and this is, as you know, already underway. With other economic measures, one will affect the increase of supplies of some commodities, the prices of which show an unstable trend; above all, I mean meat and meat products, so that a better development of cattle breeding and the monitoring of market supplies will cause the stabilization of these prices.

Regarding monetary policy, the question of the exchange rate, the stability of the exchange rate, is one of the bases of our monetary policy, and disturbances that appeared recently are already being slowly curbed by a controlled balancing of the monetary mass and commodity funds. I am sure that with such measures of control we are going to keep the dinar a rare and desired commodity with a stable price.

[Petrovic] Thank you very much.

[Sainovic] I thank you too.

Easing of FRY Sanctions May Take Effect 28 Sep

LD2609171994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1558 GMT 26 Sep 94

[By Stevan Cordas]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia expects that the United Nations Security Council might start implementing Resolution 943 easing the sanctions against Yugoslavia as early as Wednesday. The implementation of the resolution is expected to follow a report by the United Nations humanitarian mission coordinator in the former Yugoslavia, Bo Pellnas, that might reach New York on Tuesday.

The expectations are based on the latest information from diplomats at the U.N. headquarters in New York who await the resolution to take effect promptly.

The U.N. Security Council on September 23 suspended some of the comprehensive and mandatory sanctions imposed on the Yugoslav federation of Serbia and Montenegro in late May 1992. The Security Council had tightened the sanctions twice alleging Yugoslavia's involvement in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pellnas is to send his report to co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord David Owen. Stoltenberg, as a U.N. envoy, is to communicate the report to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. Butrus-Ghali would sign it upon finding it acceptable.

This eliminates the need for another meeting of the U.N. Security Council to adopt the report, because Resolution 943 takes effect 24 hours after the report is signed.

Yugoslavia expects that the implementation of the resolution is not going to be stalled as it has been the case with its adoption and believes that the resolution will take effect later this week. Butrus-Ghali is to submit a monthly report to the Security Council on an efficient implementation of the Yugoslav blockade of the Bosnian Serb republic.

The Yugoslav Government on August 4 severed all political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serb republic and closed the common border to transport of all goods other than humanitarian.

Butrus-Ghali has already submitted a report to the Security Council that has undoubtedly prompted the passing of Resolution 943. The resolution will cover an initial period of 100 days.

The period could be shorter in case of a total annulment of Resolution 820, which was passed in April 1993 blocking all transit of goods across the Yugoslav territory and freezing all Yugoslav companies' financial assets abroad.

The annulment could take place if the Bosnian Serb republic accepted the "Contact Group" plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Contact Group is composed of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany.

TANJUG, Slovak Agency Agree To Cooperate

LD2609133494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1229 GMT 26 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—Ivan Melihercek, director of the Slovak news agency TASR, and TANJUG's editor-in- chief, Dusan Zupan, met in Belgrade today and signed an agreement on cooperation and on an exchange of information and photographic material between the agencies. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Party Leaders Comment on Lifting Sanctions

LD2509205594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2047 GMT 25 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 25 (TANJUG)—The leader of Serbia's largest opposition parliamentary party said on Sunday that the United Nations sanctions had to be lifted wholly and without delay. Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement said there were no reasons

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

for keeping the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro in a cage any longer.

In an interview with Radio Kragujevac, Draskovic commented on views expressed by some Serbian opposition leaders who said that the price for the United Nations Security Council decision to ease the sanctions against Yugoslavia had been too high. Draskovic said that any price had to be paid in order to prevent destruction, more refugees, poverty and disaster that a continuation of war would bring.

Cedomir Mirkovic—vice-president of the New Democracy Party, which is the coalition partner of the Socialist Party of Serbia in the Serbian government—said on Saturday that the U.N. decision was a 'sign of strong option for peace and speeding up of the peace process.' Regardless of the fact that the beginning of lifting the sanctions is partial and set for an initial period of time, it is important that our active return to the international community has begun, Mirkovic said. He said that Yugoslavia had a chance to embark upon a road of an overall revival and that that chance must not be missed.

President of the opposition Democratic Reformist Party of Vojvodina Dragoljub Petrovic said on Saturday that the easing of the sanctions was a victory of those forces in Yugoslavia which had opted for peace and which had demonstrated great responsibility in view of the interests of the people. He said it was necessary to restore Yugoslavia's reputation through cooperativeness with the international community and to correct some flaws in the proposed 'Contact Group' plan for Bosnia- Herzegovina through negotiations after its acceptance.

Commentary Welcomes UN Vote To Ease Sanctions

AU2609084194 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Sep 94

[Commentary by Tatjana Lenard]

[Text] The world is reacting extremely positively to the UN Security Council's decision to abolish the first package of sanctions against the FRY. Numerous countries, avowed friends and neighbors alike, have welcomed our country's return to the international community. The prevailing conclusion is that the United Nations in this way has acknowledged Belgrade's peace-promoting role and the message from our domestic political scene that peace is our most pressing priority task.

The results of the vote prove that this was understood by the UN Security Council, too. Of the 15 Council members only two voted against the relaxation of sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Islamic lobby—which, following the examples of the massacres in Markale and Vaso Miskin Street [in Sarajevo], at the very last moment launched a fabrication about Yugoslav helicopters over Bosnia—could not stop this decision. Not even the belligerent first lady of U.S. diplomacy, Madeleine Albright, obstructed the vote on a document that was firmly backed by Russia and the European troika in the Contact Group. The vote actually marked the overcoming of a nearly three-year blockade of a country that was unfairly punished with sanctions for the mistakes of numerous protagonists in the Yugoslav crisis. There is no doubt that the FRY has been a factor for peace at all stages of the peace process. It has supported all the peace plans—Cutilheiro's, Owen and Stoltenberg's, and the latest Contact Group project—and everything that guaranteed equal treatment of all the warring sides in Bosnia and a lasting and just peace. Simultaneously, various foreign mentors and brokers prematurely granted state legitimacy to the former Yugoslav republic, and by their actions encouraged the sides in the war, and did everything to fan rather than extinguish the conflict. The latest such action is the U.S. threat to lift the arms embargo for the Muslims, to which the Europeans are adamantly opposed.

Because of all these circumstances the UN Security Council decision to ease the sanctions against FRY is truly encouraging. It proves not only that the peace policy of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and our federal state is valued for the first time and that Yugoslavia is being acknowledged as an equal partner in the talks and an important factor on the international political scene, but also that it has been established who is playing what role in the Yugoslav war drama.

The international community now has the opportunity to take another step following this crucial turnabout, namely, to initiate and accelerate the coming phase in the abolition of sanctions, which would free our economy from embargo. Japanese members of parliament spoke in favor of this in Belgrade last week. This possibility is also contained in the text of the resolution about the relaxation of sanctions against Yugoslavia in the formulation that further progress will be monitored. It has been rumored that Russian President Yeltsin will also raise the question of the abolition of sanctions against Yugoslavia during the Russian-U.S. summit in Washington next week. With this, the only way to recognize the FRY's role adequately, the world would demonstrate how much it truly cares about peace and the development in the Balkans.

DSS Chairman Kostunica's Visit to Pale Viewed

AU2609162194 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17-18 Sep 94 pp 1,3

[Report by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "Creation of a National Democratic Alliance?"]

[Text] Pale—The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] shares the opinion of the Bosnian Serb leadership "not only in principle but also in detail" that a peace is urgently needed—but a just and stable one. In the opinion of Vojislav Kostunica, the DSS chairman, the plan made by the Contact Group offers the Serbian Republic neither in the territorial nor in the institutional

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

sense the possibility to become constituted as a state that could then be "firmly" linked with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The host to the DSS delegation, which visited the Serbian Republic for the first time, was Mr. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. He said that nobody was entitled to sign the proposed maps because they had been rejected by the people in the referendum. "The international community cannot expect one to sign such a proposal; it can only hope that we shall be defeated, they should, however, calculate whether we shall be defeated or not, and if we are, whether it is good for Europe to create an Islamic state in Europe," Karadzic remarked.

In the news conference given at the end of the visit together with Velibor Ostojic, the chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party Executive Committee, Vojislav Kostunica proposed the creation of "a broad democratic alliance opposed to the Belgrade regime, which had already recognized the borders drawn between Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina after World War II, although it was still hiding it." As candidates for this political bloc the DSS chairman proposed—apart from the Democratic Party—the Serbian Liberal Party, Rakitic's DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], the People's Party of Montenegro, as well as certain powers other than parties, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Kostunica energetically denied that the DSS would organize a branch across the Drina River as long as the war was going on.

The DSS chairman announced the lifting of the embargo against the Bosnian Serbs as the most important task of his party in the following period and added that a broader cooperation with other Serbian parties would not be excluded in that struggle.

When the DSS delegation, whose members also included Predrag Protic, the DSS vice-chairman, and Mirko Petrovic, the chairman of the Executive Committee, crossed the Drina River at the Krakaj border-crossing, the first piece of news (which had not proved to be true until that moment) was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would cut off passenger traffic toward the Serbian Republic, too. What the telephone blockade means was first of all felt by journalists who were not able to call their Belgrade offices because the telephone connection with Knin was cut off on Thursday. Several telephones in Pale that are attached to the Belgrade switchboard became silent, too. It must be mentioned out of interest that only Studio B, Radio B-92, BORBA and NIN, that is the media that are considered "anti-Serbian" and "traitors," reported on the meeting in Pale.

Everything in the war capital of the Bosnian Serbs has changed since its disassociation from official Belgrade. The original distrust that "Sloba could betray" was replaced by the bitter words and reconciliation to fate, so that it can be heard even in the highest circles that "the first producer of war in this area does not allow the Serbian Republic leadership to cross the Drina River, which is, however, allowed to Izetbegovic's Serbs Mirko Pejanovic and Ljubomir Berberovic."

The ordinary people in Pale see in every man who comes from the Drina River right bank "the hope that Serbia does not think in the way Milosevic is speaking and acting." Although the employees of the Serbian Television buried their editor in chief, Risto Djogo (most of the people we spoke to do not believe the official version on his death) on Thursday, they received their Belgrade colleagues without asking for the name of the paper they come from, which has been an unwritten rule so far. The delegation that played host to the DSS representatives consisted of all leading Bosnian Serbs: Karadzic, Krajisnik, Koljevic, Plavsic, Buha, Kozic, the prime minister, and the writers Gojko Djogo and Momo Kapor, which gave rise to political speculations that the DSS had been strengthened by literary powers. The Bosnian Bishop Nikolaj and the Herzegovinian Bishop Atanasije were seen in the Serbian Republic Presidency building, too.... Only General Ratko Mladic was not present, and the question asked by journalists "where Mladic was and why he had not given his opinion on the peace plan," was answered from a reliable source by the words that "he was where he was supposed to be," and added the witty remark that "the general had left for the front in order to avoid answering that question."

Bosnian Serbs leaders do not want to comment on "civilian observers" being posted on the Drina River right bank (they ask what kind of civilians they are if they are led by a brigadier general) since this was "an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." President Karadzic said that the mutual damage would be considerable since "25 percent of the Yugoslav territory important from the point of view of the economy belonged to the Serbian Republic." Karadzic repeated during these two days that the Serbian Republic "had not rejected the peace process and that it was ready to talk about certain percentages so that a joint solution would be found."

The Bosnian Serbs leaders wanted to show to their guests from Serbia that their army was still holding the front lines. Kostunica and his friends were taken along the first front line on Trebevic Mountain, around the firing positions at the former "Osmica" boardinghouse and the bob-track where Serbian and Muslim positions are only approximately 30 meters apart.

Soldiers claim that there has been no fire for a long time already, that the line is quiet. Most of the soldiers tried to convince the guests that "they did not want a joint state with those down there," but "that they had nothing against a quiet life even if it was one next to the other." If we can make a reporter's observation, it can be said that there is a lot of melancholy in the soldiers' words. "This is my house below Kosevo, you see," or "That is the hotel I worked at," or "Can you see strollers at Bascarsija?" they said....

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

Only a 100 meters to the other side, toward Jahorina and Pale, life is almost normal. Cows and sheep amble along an asphalt road, weekend houses have been revived, some refugees have found new homes here.

We had a police escort from Pale to the bridge at the Sepak- Loznica border crossing. The DSS delegation and the team of reporters were not controlled by the Yugoslav police this time.

Kosovo

Rugova, Albanian Envoy Discuss Balkan Situation

AU2409182594 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 24 Sep 94

[Report by Mehmet Haziri]

[Text] President Ibrahim Rugova received Mr. Veli Minarolli, charge d'affaires of the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade, and Shkelzen Ymeri, third secretary of this embassy in Prishtina.

[Haziri] President Rugova briefed Mr. Minarolli on the latest developments and the current situation in the Republic of Kosova. For this reason, Dr. Rugova warned of the danger arising from increased repression and frequent trumped-up incidents by Serbian forces along the Albanian-Kosovar border.

In a long and sincere talk, Chairman Rugova and the charge d'affaires discussed the situation in the Balkans and the stabilizing role the Albanians play in the region.

Rugova Views Current Events, Ties With Albania

AU2409162894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Sep 94

[Text] The Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] is the largest and most powerful party, and its presidency is a presidency of continuation, consolidation, and unity—that is what Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, told correspondents today at his usual news conference. Qani Mehmeti is on the line:

[Mehmeti] Characterizing events in Kosova, President Rugova pointed out that the Serbian power in Kosova is not only continuing to exert repression against Kosovar Albanians and imprison them; it has also started to label them as terrorists. Rugova demanded therefore that all political prisoners be released.

Rugova condemned the beating of several Albanians in Tetove by the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] police and asked the government of that republic no longer to act that way with Kosovars.

He told correspondents that over the past week Kosova has been the focus of international attention and welcomed the newest Amnesty International report condemning the drastic human rights violations in Kosova. The solution to the Kosova issue would remain a condition for the international community to finally lift sanctions against Serbia. All the Albanian political parties continue to have a consensus regarding the status of Kosova, President Rugova told reporters.

Regarding a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, Rugova stressed that there is no official indication thereof, but it is a good thing that more has been recently written and said about this dialogue. Concerning the proposal on a confederal link between Kosova and Albania, Rugova told reporters that the idea continues to enjoy favorable reactions in the international public.

In the name of the Coordination Council of Albanian Political Parties in the Former Yugoslavia, Rugova asked Albanian political parties in Macedonia to form a coalition in the coming elections and called on representatives to abandon disputes, accusations against one other, and personal whims while there is still time.

At today's news conference, Dr. Fehmi Agani explained the reason that he withdrew his resignation from the LDK Presidency, saying that it was because a promising debate was provoked in the LDK National Council meeting and the Presidency included the right people.

Rugova Opposes Easing Sanctions Against Serbia

AU2709131394 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Sep 94 p 6

[Report by Matthias Rueb on interview with Kosovo's LDK Leader Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina on 25 September: "Do Not Forget Kosovo"]

[Excerpts] A concept is haunting southeast Europe, the concept of confederation. In Bosnia, Muslim Bosniaks and Croats want to enter into a confederation once their still shaky joint state has taken shape. French Foreign Minister Juppe has said that the Bosnian Serbs must be granted the same right: If they want to link their self-proclaimed "Serbian republic" [last two words in Serbo-Croatian] to Serbia, then they should be able to do so on the basis of a confederation. In some miraculous way, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been recognized under international law, should be preserved and something new emerge at the same time that satisfies the demands of all the parties to the conflict. Ultimately, one will not be able to ignore the Croatian Serbs, who want to join their "republic of Serbian Krajina" [last three words in Serbo-Croatian], which they proclaimed on occupied territory in Croatia, to a confederal entity of the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia—on the basis of a confederation, of course.

At the moment, the community of nations obviously regards confederation as the best instrument to pacify the disintegrated, war- and crisis-shaken Yugoslavia. This idea has now also been taken up by the president of the Kosovar Albanians, writer Ibrahim Rugova. [passage omitted]

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

So far, a solution to the Kosovo problem is not in sight. In an interview with FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, President Rugova, who is also chairman of the dominant party of the Kosovar Albanians, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK), said that currently this very popular idea of a confederation might also offer a possibility of solving the crisis in Kosovo. Kosovo could establish close ties with the Albanian fatherland without leaving the Serbian state entity. This adds a fourth option to the three that the LDK has so far presented to solve the crisis, Rugova said. First, should there be no changes to the internal or external borders of the former Yugoslavia, then the LDK advocates the formation of a neutral and independent Kosovo that is open towards the Serbs and Albanians. Second, should the internal borders of the former Yugoslavia be changed, the LDK calls for the establishment of an Albanian republic of Kosovo. Should—and this is the third scenario—the external borders of the former Yugoslavia be changed, the LDK calls for unification of Kosovo and Albania. The idea of a confederation is now a fourth alternative.

Rugova knows they are maximum demands. "These demands should, however, not obstruct the assumption of negotiations with the Serbian Government," Rugova said. He is ready to enter into talks with Belgrade without any preconditions. Asked about the talks between a Kosovar Albanian negotiator in the Swiss Embassy in Belgrade and a negotiator for the Serbian side, Markovic, Rugova said that these only served to establish personal contacts. Negotiations as such did not start in the meeting in July. Besides, it was not yet certain whether Markovic, who switched from being a leading practical philosopher to the chief Serbian ideologist, or Serbian President Milosevic' special envoy, the "Yugoslav" Deputy Prime Minister Simic, should conduct the talks for the Serbian side.

Rugova proposes first to talk about education policy and syllabuses, and the mass media. A first sign of good will on the part of the Serbs could be to restore to the Kosovar Albanians access to public school buildings and permit classes there following Albanian syllabuses. These days, hundreds of thousands of pupils and students are starting the fifth year in which they are taught in private homes by their Albanian teachers and professors. Since the introduction of the "new dinar" in January this year and the containment of inflation, the financial situation has deteriorated for the Albanian education system. Since in the shadow state of the Kosovar Albanians all monetary transactions have been carried out in German marks [DM] anyway, they did not suffer from the loss of value of the old "Yugoslav" dinar in 1993; on the contrary. "Last year, one could feed a teacher or professor on DM50 a month, while now we need DM200. This makes a big difference, considering that we have 20,000 teachers and other auxiliary staff," Rugova said. Without the support of Kosovar Albanians living abroad, who voluntarily contribute 3 percent of their net incomes to their home country, this unparalleled education system would not be viable. Albanian craftsmen and tradesmen in Kosovo itself also contribute part of their incomes to maintaining this education system for their children. Yet, under the new economic conditions the lack of money has become chronic.

Rugova opposes the imminent easing of sanctions against "Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro). It is the desire of the international community of states to reward Serbian President Milosevic for severing ties with the Bosnian Serbs, who are unwilling to conclude peace, by suspending the sanctions in the spheres of transportation, culture, and sports for a trial period of 100 days. Rugova thinks that first a comprehensive solution for all the crises in the former Yugoslavia should be found before easing sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Croatian President Tudjman has also always demanded that without a solution to the issue of the Serb-occupied territories in Croatia there must not be any easing of sanctions. "Since the question of sanctions against 'Yugoslavia' depends on the central lines of international politics, the warnings from Zagreb and Pristina are not heard," Rugova said. Yet, he listened with satisfaction to the remark by German Foreign Minister Kinkel that sanctions against "Yugoslavia" cannot be lifted for good without a solution to the Kosovo problem.

President Rugova repeats his request not to forget Kosovo despite the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He emphasizes that "Kosovo must be put on the agenda of all international talks with Belgrade." He also sticks to his proposal to install a civilian administration by European or international organizations to ease the situation in Kosovo and initiate demilitarization. "One could see that the problems spread from Slovenia to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Invariably a new front was opened, if not one of war then one of repression," Rugova says. It has nothing to do with fatalism to fear that a scenario of repression could turn into a scenario of war, but historical fact. "This is why we in Kosovo have opted for the path of non-violent, passive resistance, and will stick to it in the future, too," Rugova concludes.

This report contains information which is or may be copyrighted in a number of countries. Therefore, copying and/or further dissemination of the report is expressly prohibited without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner(s).

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.